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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

KENT KARL KIRKWOOD,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20010321-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a jury conviction for possession of a dangerous weapon
(knife) by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-10-503(2)(a) (1999). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 & Supp. 2001).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court's conditional ruling on the potential admissibility of other
crimes evidence unfairly force defendant to choose between testifying and subjecting
himself to cross-examination, or not testifying in order to ensure that evidence of his
prior bad acts was excluded?
No standard of review applies. Because defendant ultimately chose not to testify,
no evidence regarding his prior illegitimate use of a knife was admitted, and any issue
concerning the trial court's conditional evidentiary ruling is therefore waived. Luce v.

United States, 469 U.S. 38, 42 (1984); State v. Gentry, 1M P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah
1987); State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 567 (Utah App. 1991) (all applying waiver rule to
claim of potential improper impeachment with a prior conviction). See also Page v.
State, 725 P.2d 1082, 1086) (Alaska App. 1986); United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900
(2nd Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 489 U.S.1070 (1989); United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d
1259, 1269-1270 (8th Cir. 1985) (all extending waiver rule to claim of alleged potential
improper use of prior crimes, wrongs and acts evidence).
However, if the Court were to overlook defendant's failure to preserve his claim
by testifying, the trial court's conditional evidentiary ruling should not be overturned
unless the ruling exceeded the trial court's discretion. See State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f
33 n.4, 27 P.2d 1115; State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, f 18, 993 P.2d 837, cert, denied,
528 U.S. 1164(2000).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-501(4)(a) (1999):
"Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The
following factors shall be used in determining whether a knife, or any other
item, object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a
dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any;
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used; and
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object, or thing
may be used.

2

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-10-503(2)(a) (1999):

Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have in his
possession or under his custody or control any .. . dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-10-501.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b):
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character
purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
Utah R. Evid. 609(a):
General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the
witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of
such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a dangerous weapon
(knives), both third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(2)(a)
(1999) (R4-5). Following a one-day jury trial held on 24 January 2001, defendant was
acquitted of one count and convicted of the other (R140). The trial court imposed the
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statutory zero-to-five-year term, consecutive to any other terms defendant may be serving
(R158). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R165).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant was on probation for robbery on 30 August 2000, when two officers
from Adult Probation and Parole performed a routine probation search of his home
(Rl 88:28-29). While searching defendant's bedroom, the officers found two knives
(Rl 88:32, 36-37). As a restricted person, defendant could not properly possess any knife
for any purpose other than as an eating utensil or tool (Rl 88:40,43-46).1
The first knife was found on a bedside table in defendant's bedroom (Rl88:32).
The knife had "a blade around four inches [long], curving on the end and the handle
[was] either wood or bone" (Rl 88:32). Defendant claimed that he used the knife for
eating, but the officers found no food or leftovers in the room and no food remnants on
the knife itself (Rl 88:33, 56-57, 66). Defendant knew that "kitchen knives belong[ed] in
the kitchen and if they were anywhere else, they would be considered a weapon"
(Rl 88:34-35).
The second knife was found in a gym bag within reach of defendant's bed
(Rl 88:37, 65). The knife had a three-inch, serrated blade and a rubber handle (id.).
Defendant claimed that this knife belonged "to a friend," but defendant could not

'Defendant was not charged with possessing two knife-too I combinations seized
from his bedside table and from a tool box in his room (Rl88:69) (Exhs. ##F-E).
4

identify his "friend" for the officers (Rl 88:38, 67). The gym bag did not contain any
information identifying its owner (Rl88:66).
Defendant was convicted for possessing the first knife found on the bedside table,
but was acquitted of possessing the second knife found in the gym bag (R140).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is well established that before a defendant can complain on appeal about
improper impeachment with a prior conviction, he must testify. The need for the full
development of an adequate record for purposes of appellate review is equally
compelling where, as here, a defendant alleges potential improper use of prior crimes,
wrongs, and acts evidence. Therefore, because defendant did not ultimately testify, he
waived any claim of error based on the trial court's conditional ruling, that if he testified,
the prosecutor "may"cross-examine him about his prior illegitimate use of a knife.
In any event, even if the Court were to overlook defendant's failure to preserve his
claim here, the trial court did not exceed its discretion in making the conditional ruling.
Defendant's intent in possessing the instant knife was a disputed issue and the State
lacked any direct evidence of his intent. Therefore, evidence of defendant's prior illicit
use of a knife would have been highly probative. Finally, the jury was already
necessarily aware that defendant was a felon; thus, any additional prejudice would have
been slight.

5

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONDITIONAL RULING REGARDING
THE POTENTIAL ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER CRIMES
EVIDENCE DID NOT UNFAIRLY FORCE DEFENDANT TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN TAKING THE STAND AND SUBJECTING
HIMSELF TO CROSS-EXAMINATION, OR NOT TAKING THE
STAND AND PRECLUDING ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, and after noting that defendant's intent
was a disputed issue, the trial court conditionally ruled that it "may" allow the prosecutor
to cross-examine defendant about his use of a knife in committing his prior conviction if
defendant chose to testify (Rl88:72). Defendant claims the ruling exceeded the trial
court's discretion and unfairly kept him from testifying. Aplt. Br. at 2.
However, defendant's choice not to testify successfully precluded admission of
this highly probative evidence (Rl 88:75). Defendant's appellate challenge is therefore
improper. In choosing not to testify, defendant failed to develop an adequate record for
appellate review and waived any claim of error based on the trial court's conditional
ruling.
Proceedings Below.2 The admissibility of defendant's prior illegitimate use of
knife arose during the testimony of Officer Hansen. Defendant acknowledged to Officer
Hansen that he was not supposed to have the knife she found in his bedroom, and
explained to her that he "brought it into his room the night before when he was eating"

A complete copy of the trial transcript (R188), is contained in the addendum.
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(Rl88:32). On cross-examination defense counsel elicited from Officer Hansen that
probationers can legitimately use a knife for eating purposes (Rl 88:40). Defense counsel
also successfully introduced two knife-tool combinations found in the defendant's room,
but for which he was not charged (Rl88:43-45). Finally, defense counsel elicited that
Officer Hansen's classification of a knife as a permissible tool or as an impermissible
weapon was based on its intended use (Rl 88:45-47).
On redirect the prosecutor clarified that Officer Hansen distinguished the knifetool combinations as having arguably legitimate purposes, whereas the two non-tool
knives found in defendant's possession did not (Rl 88:48). Following a side-bar, the
proceedings continued outside the presence of the jury with the trial court stating as
follows:
.. . Okay. I- -I think I understand [the prosecutor's] argument. Ordinarily,
the nature of the underlying offense and what was used to commit the
underlying offense would be of no concern in this trial; but the distinction
that you've tried to make here is between these knives- -between knives as
weapons and knives as tools.
And it strikes me that [the prosecutor] has a good argument that- with respect to [defendant], that he intended to possess a knife was a
weapon because of his use of knife in this prior felony.
Let me hear what your response to that is.
(Rl 88:49). Defense counsel argued that under State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App.
1990), unless defendant opened the door, the prosecutor could not inquire into the details
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of defendant's prior robbery conviction, and that another witness could not open the door
for defendant (id.).
The trial court responded that in "making this a big thing about the distinction
between- -or the fact that a knife can also be a tool," defendant "opened the door" to the
issue whether the knives were intended to be used as weapons (Rl 88:50-51). The trial
court further observed that "what this requires us to do is really look into [defendant's]
mind and determine whether he intended to possess this knife as a weapon or for some
other purpose" (Rl 88:52). Noting that the evidence "shed[] some light" on defendant's
intent, and that it was also "real prejudicial," the trial court ultimately determined that
Officer Hansen lacked sufficient personal information to testify that defendant had in fact
used a knife to commit the robbery for which he was then on probation (Rl 88:53-55).
The prosecutor's continued redirect examination of Officer Hansen established
that she observed no plates, food, crumbs, or other indications that defendant used the
four-inch knife blade seized from his bedside table for eating purposes (Rl88:56).
Further, defendant had not claimed to use the knife as tool (FU 88:57). Rather, when
asked if defendant claimed to use the knife "at his employment," Officer Hansen stated,
"No. [Defendant] was unemployed"(i7/.).
After the State rested, and outside the jury's presence, the trial court elaborated on
its initial ruling prohibiting the prosecutor from asking Officer Hansen about the details
of defendant's robbery conviction (Rl 88:70).
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There is one- -I would like to express myself more fully on the
evidentiary issue that came up with respect to whether or not [the
prosecutor] is entitled to put on evidence of the prior crime involving a
knife.
First- -the first question that I- -I have to address is whether or not
that's relevant to all of these proceedings and it seems to be it is relevant,
it's not overwhelmingly relevant. What- -the- -the issue that we're trying
to decide in this case is whether or not [defendant's] possession of a knife
was intended to be possession of a weapon or possession of a tool.
If you had a hundred people, hundred convicted felons that all had
in their possession a knife, I think that the intent to possess that knife as a
weapon would be somewhat greater for those felons who had used knives
in prior crimes. And so for that reason, I find it to be relevant.
The next issue is whether the relevance of that information is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect on this case. And it's not
prejudicial just because it helps the State establish its case, it has to be
unfairly prejudicial.
Now, we've already admitted in this case that [defendant] is a
convicted felon. Nine-tenths of the prejudice that [defendant] suffers as a
result of this information coming in, he already suffers as the result of the
fact that one of the elements in this case is his prior conviction of a felony
and that's been admitted.
The additional prejudice that he res- -that he experiences as a result
of the jury learning that that prior conviction involved the use of a knife is
only a slight increase in prejudice and really, it does go to establishing his
intent with respect to the possession of these items. And I think it's made
more relevant in this case and [the prosecutor] has talked about opening the
door.
The relevance is- -of that information is increased in this case in
light of the defense's arguments that this is but one of a number of tools
that [defendant] possessed and he did not intend to possess it as a weapon.
We dodged the bullet with respect to Ms. Hansen's testimony
because I ruled that with respect to her testimony, she lacked sufficient
9

personal knowledge to make that- -to testify, as far as the circumstances of
the prior crime.
That still may come up in other context [sic] and for that reason,
[defense counsel], I think you want to think carefully about whether or not
[defendant] should testify because he obviously has information about- -he
has personal knowledge with respect to his prior crime.
(Rl 88:70-72).
The trial court also distinguished defendant's reliance on Tucker, clarifying that
he would "not allow discussion of the knife to come in for purposes of impeachment"
(Rl 88:73). Rather, evidence as to the knife was admissible "for whatever relevance and
whatever light that it may shed on [defendant's] intent with possessing these particular
items" {id.). While the trial court did not *expressly invoke rule 404(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence, the trial court's recognition that details of defendant's prior crime may be
admissible as probative of defendant's disputed intent in this case is consistent with the
rule.
Thereafter, defendant elected not to testify and rested his case without calling any
witnesses (Rl88:75).
A*

The Rule of United States v. Luce and State v. Gentry is
Dispositive: Defendant Waived Any Claim of Error
Regarding the Trial Court's Conditional Evidentiary
Ruling When He Declined to Testify.

On appeal, defendant no longer claims that the trial court's conditional ruling
violates Tucker, Nor could he, given his failure to testify. It is well established that to
"preserve for appellate review a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction,
10

a defendant must testify:' State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 567 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987). In adopting this rule, the Utah
Supreme Court followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court, agreeing that
[rjequiring that a defendant testify in order to preserve Rule 609(a),[Utah
Rules of Evidence] claims, will enable the reviewing court to determine the
impact any erroneous impeachment may have had in light of the record as a
whole; it will also tend to discourage making such motions solely to 'plant'
reversible error in the event of conviction.
Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1035 (quoting Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 42 (1984)). See
State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 358 (Utah 1980) (prc-Luce/Gentry case recognizing
that a criminal defendant who exercises his constitutional right to remain silent and not
testify cannot be heard to complain that the court forced that choice upon him when it
denied his motion in limine to exclude testimony relating to his prior convictions). See
also State v. Wickham, 796 P.2d 1354, 1356 n. 5 (Alaska 1990) (collecting cases and
observing majority of state courts have adopted Luce).
While Gentry and Luce are rule 609(a) impeachment cases, other jurisdictions
have extended Luce to preliminary or conditional rulings based on rule 404(b). See
Page v. State, 725 P.2d 1082, 1086) (Alaska App. 1986); United States v. Ortiz, 857
F.2d 900 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1070 (1989); United States v. Johnson,
161 F.2d 1259, 1269-1270 (8th Cir. 1985). Cf. State v. Huntley, 681 A.2d 10, 13 (Me.
1996) (not citing or seeking to extend Luce authority, but similarly rejecting on waiver
grounds non-testifying defendant's claim that trial court's preliminary rule 404(b) ruling
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chilled his constitutional right to testify), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1064 (1997). Luce has
also been extended to rules 403 and 608(b). See United States v. Johnson, 903 F.2d
1219, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 985 (1990); United States v. Griffin, 818
F.2d 97, 102-06 (1 st Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 844 (1987) (rule 403) (both rule
403); United States v. Weichert, 783 F.2d 23, 25 (2nd Cir.) (per curiam), cert, denied,
479 U.S. 831 (1986); United States v. Dimatteo, 759 F.2d 831, 832-833 (11th Cir.), cert,
denied, 474 U.S. 860 (1985) (both rule 608(b)). See also United States v. Nivica, 887
F.2d 1110, 1115-1117 (1st Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1005 (1990) (defendant
sought advance ruling that if he took the stand, cross-examination would be limited to
the scope of direct and to questions bearing on credibility; motion was denied, but
defendant never testified or asked for voir dire; ruling held not appealable).
Because the policies addressed in Luce are virtually indistinguishable from those
arising here, extension of the Luce/Gentry rule to this rule 404(b) context is sound. As
the United States Supreme Court observed in Luce, if Luce had "testified and been
impeached by evidence of a prior conviction," the decision to admit the impeachment
evidence would have been reviewable because the appellate court "would then have had
a complete record detailing the nature of [Luce's] testimony, the scope of the crossexamination, and the possible impact of the impeachment on the jury's verdict." Id. at
41.
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However, where, as here and in Luce, the defendant does not choose to testify and
risk admission of the alleged potentially improper evidence, appellate review is neither
assured nor warranted. This is because review of the "subtle evidentiary questions" is
unavoidably "handicapped" by the lack of a "factual context." Id. Luce accordingly
notes several specific concerns which militate against appellate review of claimed
conditional evidentiary error. 469 U.S. at 41.
First, rule 609(a) requires courts to weigh the probative value of a prior conviction
against its prejudicial effect. This required weighing cannot be performed without
knowing the "precise nature of the defendant's testimony," and this cannot be known if
the defendant does not testify. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41.
Second, the Supreme Court observed that "[a]ny possible harm flowing from a
district court's in limine ruling permitting impeachment by a prior conviction is wholly
speculative." Id. Indeed, conditional rulings are necessarily subject to change as a case
progresses, "particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was contained in the
defendant's proffer." Id. The Supreme Court further observed that, "even if nothing
unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling." Id. Thus, "it would be a matter of
conjecture" whether the lower court would have ultimately allowed the defendant to be
impeached with a prior conviction, and/or if the prosecution would have ultimately
sought to impeach with a prior conviction. Id. at 41-42.
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Third, a defendant's decision to testify "seldom turns on the resolution of one
factor." Id. at 42 (quotation omitted). Therefore, appellate courts "cannot assume that
the adverse ruling motivated a defendant's decision not to testify." Id. While a
defendant "might"commit to testify if the in limine motion is granted, the Supreme Court
recognized that "such a commitment is virtually risk free because of the difficulty of
enforcing it." Id.
Finally, even if each of the above difficulties could be surmounted in an
individual case, the appellate court "would still face the question of harmless error." Id.
Unless a defendant is required to testify in order to preserve his challenge, "almost any
error would result in the windfall of an automatic reversal; the appellate court could not
logically term 'harmless' an error that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying."
Id. However, if the defendant testifies the appellate court can "determine the impact any
erroneous impeachment may have had in light of the record as a whole; it will also tend
to discourage making such motions solely to 'plant' reversible error in the event of a
conviction." Id.
The record development concerns Luce notes are just as compelling in the case of
undeveloped rule 404(b) evidence. See Page, 725 P.2d at 1086; Huntley, 681 A.2d at
13; Ortiz, 857 P.2d at 905-06; Johnson, 161 F.2d at 1269-1270. Just like rule 609(a),
rule 404(b) requires weighing of the probative and prejudicial effect. See Utah R. Evid.
404(b) ("... evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-
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character purpose and meets the requirements Rules 402 and 403).3 Moreover,
defendant's claim of harm is as speculative as the claims in Luce and Gentry, given that
the challenged knife evidence was never revealed to the jury. While defendant's choice
not to testify was likely due to the trial court's conditional ruling (defense counsel told
the jury defendant would testify in opening statement (see Rl 88:25)), this one factor is
itself insufficient to override the remaining and legitimate concerns about the adequacy
of the record for meaningful appellate review.
Indeed, this case and each of the other cases extending Luce similarly involve
evidence held to be conditionally admissible. The trial court in each instance ruled that it
could only be introduced if a subsequent event occurred (e.g., if the defendants in Luce,
Page, Huntley, Nivica or Johnson (9th Cir.), testified). And in each instance the merits
of the evidentiary ruling necessarily depended upon further factual development. None
of these conditional rulings were capable of meaningful resolution in the vacuum created
by the defendants' failure to testify. Ultimately, the lower court decisions in this case,
the Johnson cases, Page, Huntley, Ortiz, Griffin, Nivica, Weichert, and Dimatteo,

3

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
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whatever their initial inclination, depended on the development of a "specific record."
Nivica, 887 F.2d at 1117.
In sum, Utah already applies Luce to conditional rule 609(a) impeachment rulings.
Gentry, 141 P.2d at 1035; Taylor, 818 P.2d at 567 n.4. Further, the record development
concerns addressed in Luce are equally applicable in this conditional rule 404(b) setting.
This Court should therefore extend the Luce/Gentry rule and hold that defendant waived
his right to challenge the trial court's conditional admissibility mling when he declined to
testify and risk potential cross-examination regarding his prior criminal use of a knife.
See McCumber, 622 P.2d at 358.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Ruled That Cross-Examination
Regarding Defendant's Prior Illegitimate Use of a Knife
May be Probative of His Disputed Intent in Possessing the
Instant Knife.

In any event, even if the Court were to overlook the sound record concerns for
applying the Luce/Gentry waiver rule in this rule 404(b) context, the trial court did not
exceed its discretion in conditionally ruling that it "may" allow cross-examination
regarding defendant's prior criminal use of a knife if he chose to testify (R188:72).
Indeed, rule 404(b) expressly provides for the admission of prior crimes to show intent, a
disputed issue in this case (see Rl 88:25, 86).
Significantly, defendant acknowledges that "defense counsel alerted the jury that
[defendant] claimed that he used the knife for eating and to cut tape." Aplt. Br. at 19
Indeed, defense counsel's opening statement clearly disputed that defendant had any
16

illegitimate purpose in possessing the knife (Rl88:25). Moreover, defendant told Officer
Hansen he possessed the knife found by his bedside for eating purposes (Rl 88:32). And
defense counsel cross-examined Officer Hansen regarding possible legitimate uses for
the knife which were consistent with defendant's explanation (Rl 88:40, 43-47). Given
these circumstances, evidence regarding defendant's prior criminal use of a knife was
arguably admissible in the State's case-in-chief as probative of defendant's disputed
intent, assuming the trial court's foundational concerns had been met (see Rl88:53-55,
72). See Taylor, 818 P.2d at 568, n 4, 569-572 (holding claim of error under rule 609
was waived, but that defendant's prior arrest and conviction was properly admitted in
State's case-in-chief under rules 403, and 404(b)).4
Therefore, if defendant had testified and further disputed his intent, crossexamination regarding his prior illegitimate use of a knife would have been both proper
and highly probative. See, e.g., State v.Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Utah 1997);
State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942,

4

Defendant complains extensively that the trial court failed to made adequate
inquiry regarding the details of his prior criminal use of a knife before making the
conditional evidentiary ruling. See, e.g.9 Aplt. Br. at 13-16, 18. However, the trial court
vigilantly ruled that because Officer Hansen gained her knowledge of the robbery solely
from the pre-sentence report she lacked sufficient personal knowledge to testify
regarding defendant's use of a knife (Rl 88:53-55, 72). In so ruling, the trial court
recognized that defendant, on the other hand, was uniquely possessed of information
regarding the critical details of the robbery (Rl 88:72). Therefore, as explained in part A,
supra, any paucity of detail is attributable solely to defendant, who ultimately declined to
testify and risk cross-examination.
17

944 (Utah 1982); State v. Brown, 577 P.2d 135, 136 (Utah 1978); State v. Ramirez, 924
P.2d 366, 369 (Utah App. 1996); State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700-701 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993); State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 296 (Utah App.
1990).
Further, while evidence about defendant's prior criminal use of a knife would
have also been prejudicial, it would not have been "unfairly prejudicial" (Rl 88:71). See
Rule 403. As recognized by the trial court, evidence of defendant's status as a felon was
already necessarily before the jury as an element of this status offense; therefore, any
additional prejudice from cross-examination regarding his use of a knife to commit the
prior robbery would have been "slight" (Rl 88:72).
Moreover, defendant concedes that the State, "lacked direct evidence of [his]
intent." Aplt. Br. at 23. Thus, the State's need for the knife evidence, assuming
defendant testified and attempted to explain away his possession of the knife, was more
than "minimal." Taylor, 818 P.2d at 571 (rejecting claim of that rule 404(b) evidence
was unfairly prejudicial where State lacked direct evidence of guilt).
Defendant's chief complaint is that he was not able to put his explanation before
the jury himself. Aplt. Br. at 26 ("Had the jury heard from [defendant], it likely would
have decided the verdict differently"). However, the jury was aware of defendant's
theory (see, e.g., Rl 88:32, 40, 43-47), and defense counsel argued defendant's theory of
legitimate possession in opening statement and closing argument (see, e.g., Rl88:25, 86).
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Given this circumstance, and that the evidence defendant complains about was never
ultimately admitted here, any claim of unfair prejudice is necessarily speculative and
should be rejected on that ground.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, defendant's felony conviction for possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on Z 3 October 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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P R O C E F p i N G S

2 I
3

THE COURT:

4

MR. ESQUEDA:

5

THE COURT:

6

Good morning.
Good morning.

Let's go on the record in the case of

State of Utah vs. Kent Karl KirKwood, Case No. 001915175.

7

Mr. Kirkwood is present, represented in this case

8

by Clayton Simms and Carlos Esqueda represents the State of

9

Utah.

10
11
12

We're set today for a jury trial on two charges,
both of which are purchase or possession of a dangerous
]weapon by a restricted person, a third-degree felony.

13
14

Counsel, are there any matters that you'd like to
bring up before we bring up the jury?

15

MR. ESQUEDA:

16

MR. SIMMS:

I don't have any, Judge.

We—we do have just one minor issue.

17

On the jury instructions, your Honor last time sort of

18

hinted that you weren't going to give the sort of right to

19

bear arms jury instruction and it may alter our defense.

20

So, I don't know if you would like to hear our argument now

21

on that.

I know that your Honor denied the motion, but—in

22

I terms of giving the jury instructions.

23

I

24
25

THE COURT:

Sure.

Go ahead.

MR. SIMMS:

Your Honor should have two jury

I instructions, one being from the U.S. Constitution stating

1

a well-regulated militia being necessary to security—the

2

security of a free state, the right of the people to keep

3

and bear arms shall not be infringed.

4

And then the other jury instruction is quoted

5

from the Utah Constitution.

6

the people of Utah to keep and bear arms for security and

7

defense of self, family, others, property or the state as

8

well as for other lawful purpose shall not be infringed,

9

but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from

10

It is the individual right of

defining the lawful use of arms.

11

We requested those two jury instructions and it

12

may alter our—our~the course of the trial, depending on

13

if those come in or not.

14

THE COURT:

And I indicated before that my

15

inclination is not to give those jury instructions. I

16

don't think that it's helpful for the jury in deciding this

17

case, neither of those instructions have application to a

18

restricted person and it's my recollection, although I

19

can't—I can't lay my hands on the case, maybe I could if I

20

reviewed the Advanced Reports; but my recollection is that

21

since we heard the motion in this case, that one of the

22

appellate courts has—has, in essence, affirmed that

23

position.

24

Are—are you aware of that case, Mr. Esqueda?

25

MR. ESQUEDA:

Yes, your Honor, and it was argued-

-we argued this in—in a motion to dismiss and essentially
these instructions are the motion to dismiss and you've
already denied that.
I'm trying to find the case and I thought I had
it right on top.

And I don't recall the name of the case,

Judge, but your reference to that is correct and I think
that was part of your ruling as well, in the motion to
dismiss; but I do not have that particular case with me.
THE COURT:

All right.

Let's get the jury on

this case and while the bailiff is doing that, it's my
recollection that before our attempted trial last time, we
worked out a stipulation that we were going to provide to
the jury on—with respect to Mr. Kirkwood's status as a
restricted person.
I didn't write it down at that time.
written something down this morning.

I've

Let me ask each of

you if this is in accordance with the stipulation that we
reached.

This is what I would tell the juror—jury:
Kent Karl Kirkwood was a restricted person by

reason of the fact that he was on probation as the result
of his conviction of the crime of robbery, a second-degree
felony.
MR. ESQUEDA:

That's correct.

My only question

is, I still wanted to submit the judgment and conviction as
my exhibit.

6

MR. SIMMS:

Your Honor, our concern with that

last one was, it said aggravated robbery, which is
incorrect.

He pled to robbery, but this says aggravated

robbery, so we would object as it being a misstatement of
what he pled to.
MR. ESQUEDA:

It does appear that there is a

typographical error that we could remedy, but this is the
actual docket, this is what is in the court file.
THE COURT:

Well, I think with the stipulation,

we don't even need to do that.
cumulative.

I think it would be

Is—is there any—I mean, we're already going

to tell the jury that this is something that they need to
accept as true.
MR. ESQUEDA:
THE COURT:

That's fine.
So, I'm not sure what that would add.

If there—
MR. ESQUEDA:

That's fine.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. SIMMS:

And—and your instruction was is that

he is—he was cur—he's currently on probation for the
robbery?
THE COURT:

This—this is what I was going to

tell them, I'll just read it again.

Kent Karl Kirkwood was

a restricted person by reason of the fact that he was on
probation—maybe I could put at all relevant times—that

7

he, at all relevant times, was on probation as a result of
his conviction of the crime of robbery, a second-degree
felony.
MR. ESQUEDA:

That's fine.

THE COURT:

Is that okay with you, Mr. Simms?

MR. SIMMS:

It is, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Do you each still have the proposed

jury instructions that I handed out last time?
MR. ESQUEDA:

Was that your—your copy that you

created?
THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. ESQUEDA:

I—I don't—

MR. SIMMS:

I have.

THE COURT:

Let me—let me heive some more of

those made.

Maybe you can have Amber make those and then

put the tabs back on them.
I received a requested voir dire from the State.
I haven't received any from defense; is that—is that
accurate?

Have you submitted any?
MR. SIMMS:

We haven't submitted any voir dire.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. ESQUEDA:
just mislabeled them.
THE COURT:

Well, I'm sorry, Judge, I do, I
I do have my copy.

Well, maybe I'll stop that from being

(inaudible) I'll be back in just a second.

8

Counsel, just for your information, when the jury
comes in, I'm going to have them seated primarily on the
left side of the courtroom.

Maybe we can have the—

everybody—both of you sit on the front row, right behind
Mr. Esqueda so that we have plenty of seats for the jurors
when they come in.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Are you going to use this as well?

THE COURT: No.
MR. ESQUEDA:
THE COURT:

Okay.

And then when we seat them in the

front, we're going to start here at the left, that will be
Juror No. 1.

We'll go across the front row and then across

the second row and across the third row.
And the list that you have been provided or
should have been provided of the jurors is already
randomized.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Okay.

And we have that.

(Off the record.)
THE COURT:

Good morning.

We are back on the

record in the case of State of Utah vs. Kent Karl Kirkwood.
We are here in the presence of counsel, the defendant and
the jury panel.

I would particularly like to welcome the

members of the jury panel this morning, welcome to the
Third District Court.

My name is Judge Anthony Quinn.

We are here today to engage in a process that's
9

1

central to our Constitutional system, that is, the peaceful

2

resolution of a legal dispute.

3

or innocence of individuals who have been charged with

4

crimes without the voluntary service of individuals such as

5

yourselves who are willing to work as jurors in these

6

cases.

7

We cannot resolve the guilt

I know that all of you have other important

8

things that you could be doing today and I'm going to be as

9

respectful as possible of your time.

The thing that we are

10

going to first of all do this morning, is select eight of

11

you to serve as jurors to try this case.

12

are going to do that is, we are going to be asking each of

13

you a number of nosy questions where we're going to ask you

14

to tell us something about your background and experiences.

15

The way that we

Those questions have two purposes.

First of all,

16

we want to make sure that each of you meet the statutory

17

qualifications to serve as jurors in the State of Utah.

18

And secondly, we want to find c_c if there's anything about

19

your background that would make it particularly hard for

20

you to be fair and impartial in a case such as the one

21

we're going to try today.

22

I know that if any of you were selected to serve

23

on this jury, you would do your best to be fair and

24

impartial; but the fact remains that none of us can be fair

25

in every case.

Sometimes a case is too close to our own

10

experiences for us to have sufficient distance to factor
out our own biases and our own experiences.

And the

parties in this case need a jury that's as free as humanly
possible from any bias, prejudice or outside influence
whatsoever.
The first thing we are going to do is, we are
going to have you seated in the front of the courtroom in
particular order.

The clerk will read your names and when

your name is read, come forward and take a seat that will
be indicated by the bailiff.
Once you're all seated, we'll place you under
oath and I'll begin the questioning.
(Whereupon, the jury voir dire was recorded but
not recorded.)
THE COURT: Mr. Esqueda, is that the jury that
you selected?
MR. ESQUEDA:

It is, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Is that the jury, Mr. Simms?

MR. SIMMS:

It is, Judge.

THE COURT: Any reason that the jury should not
be empaneled at this time?
MR. SIMMS: No.
THE COURT:

Mr. Esqueda?

MR. ESQUEDA:
THE COURT:

I'm sorry, your Honor?

Any reason the jury should not be

11

empaneled?
MR. ESQUEDA:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Okay.

The rest of you, we are going

to excuse at this time with our thanks for the time that
you've spent.

We could not have tried this case without

you, you're just as important to the resolution of this
case as those who were selected; but the good news is, you
get to go home and they have to stay.
Please stand while we excuse the balance of the
panel.
All except for the jurors may be seated and we'll
ask the jurors to take the oath.
(Whereupon, the jury panel was duly sworn by the
clerk of the Court.)
THE COURT:

As promised, we are going to take our

morning break at this time.
15-minute break.

We're going to take about a

It's my hope that we can start again

directly at 10:30.
The bailiff is going to show you to a jury room,
which will be your home away from home for the remainder of
your service.

After each break, make sure that you're in

the jury room together, so that we can bring you into the
courtroom at the same time.
You'll find in the jury room that there's a phone
that you can use to call anybody that you need to let know

12

that you're going to be tied up here for the rest of the
day.

There's also restroom facilities available in that

room.
While we're on this break and while we're on
every break during the course of this trial, you're going
to get very tired of hearing me say this:

Please don't

form or express any opinion about the case, do not discuss
the case with each other or allow anyone to discuss the
case in your presence.
Please stand while we excuse the jury for their
break.
Be seated*
Counsel, is there anything that we need to do
outside the jury's presence, prior to opening arguments?
MR. ESQUEDA:
Judge.

Just invoke the exclusionary rule,

I notice that Mr. Simms, I believe his witnesses

are here.

I have Officer Poor, who's also present and the

only request I have is that I have assistance with Ms.
Hansen present, as my agent.
THE COURT: All right.
We'll allow Ms. Hansen to stay.

That motion is granted.
Each of the other

witnesses will be required to leave the courtroom during
the opening statement and also during all the testimony.
I'm also going to ask that you not discuss the
case with each other or your testimony with anybody, until

13

the conclusion of the trial.
Anything else, Mr. Simms?
MR. SIMMS:

Your—there is—there is one other

issue.
I was handed this morning a probation agreement
that's purported to be an agreement that Mr. Kirkwood
signed.

I don't know if the State is going to offer to

admit this, but if they do, rather than objecting in the
middle of the trial, I would like to object now.

And—

because I think that there's a lot of things on this
probation agreement that would be prejudicial; talk of sort
of obtaining your G.E.D., alcohol testing, drug testing, .
chemical analysis, all that—all of the terms of probation,
I don't think are relevant to this particular crime.
I think that, first of all, the jury's likely to
get confused that this is some type of probation violation,
which it isn't.

It's a separate crime.

It's separate from

an order to show cause that Mr. Kirkwood may have in
another court.
We've already stipulated that he—that he's on
probation.

I don't know if this is necessary.

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Let me hear from Mr. Esqueda

what the relevance of this is.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Well, the relevance is, in

Condition No. 4, it specifically says no weapons. You

14

know, I—I told Mr. Simms I don't know if I'm going to
admit this, I'm not going to admit this in my case in
chief; however, if the defendant gets on the stand, it may
become relevant.
First of all, the weapons clause also goes to
intent and knowledge and he's a convicted felon and it's—
it's reinforced in his probation agreement that he's not to
have any weapons and if he has weapons, this goes to his
knowledge, which is my burden to prove and I believe it's
relevant.
THE COURT:

Well, let me think about that for a

second.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Now, and I—I'm not asking for all

the other conditions, but I will refer to a probation
agreement like a proffer through the A P & P agent, that he
was aware that he was not to have weapons, two-fold,
because he's a convicted felon and because they reiterated
it on his probation agreement.
THE COURT:

Yes.

I—I'm going to allow you to do

that because there is—there is a mental state that's
required for this crime and I think that that may well be
relevant to the jury establishing that mental state.
If you do—I don't think that the whole agreement
needs to come in—
MR. ESQUEDA:

I don't think so, either.

15

THE COURT:

—but you can make reference—you can

make reference to that provision.
And I'm going to tell the jury, if that comes in,
that they're not to consider—they're not to convict Mr.
Kirkwood based upon a violation of the probation agreement,
that that's not what this is about.

That we're going to

give them the elements of the crime at the end of the trial
and they can only convict Mr. Kirkwood if they find each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
MR. SIMMS:

That's fine.

THE COURT:

All right.

We'll be in recess until 10:30.

I'm going to ask

you to be in the courtroom at that time 'cause we'll just
bring the jury in without trying to round people up first.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Thank you, Judge.

(Recess.)
THE COURT:

We're back on the record in the

matter of State of Utah vs. Kent Karl Kirkwood, Case No.
001915175.
Mr. Kirkwood is present.
Clayton Simms.

He's represented by

Mr. Esqueda's just outside the door—

MR. ESQUEDA:
THE COURT:
MR. ESQUEDA:

Your Honor, I-—and he is now present.
I asked my witnesses to come in and

hear this—what we're about to argue, so that they'll fully

16

understand that they need to not open the door when they're
testifying.
THE COURT:

All right.

We've had a discussion

off the record in chambers about whether or not the State
can offer evidence of the reason for the search that
resulted in the location of the weapons with which Mr.
Kirk—the alleged weapons that Mr. Kirkwood is charged with
possessing.
The State wanted to put in evidence that A P & P
had received information that Mr. Kirkwood was in
possession of a firearm and that was what prompted the
search.

Mr. Simms has objected to that proposed testimony

and that was discussed in my chambers outside the jury's
presence.
I have made the ruling that I do not want the
State to offer evidence that the reason for the search was
the suspicion that Mr. Kirkwood possessed a weapon.

It was

my concern in that regard that that would be 40(2)(b)
material that might be damaging to Mr. Kirkwood's character
in the eyes of the jury and make them more likely to
convict him of the weapons charge in this case simply
because of that—that tip.

And I don't want that to

happen•
I have told Mr. Simms that he needs to be very
careful that he not open the door to that information

17

coming in, notwithstanding my ruling; and as far as I'm
concerned, any suggestion by Mr, Kirkwood or any witness
by—or Mr. Simms or any of the witnesses for the defense
that Mr. Kirkwood was simply being harassed by A P & P or
that the search was not justified, that there weren't
reasonable grounds for the search or any suggestion to that
extent, in my mind would open the door and allow the State
to prove the reasons for the search.
Anything that you would like—would you like to
supplement the record to any degree on that, Mr. Esqueda?
MR. ESQUEDA:

That was our understanding, Judge;

or at least that was my understanding.
MR. SIMMS:

That is my understanding.

THE COURT:

Let's go ahead and bring in the jury.

We're bringing in the jury and we'll ask the
witnesses once again to return to the hall.
We are back in—on the record in the matter of
State of Utah vs. Kent Karl Kirkwood.

Mr. Kirkwood is

present, both counsel are present—present, and the jury is
present.
Mr. Esqueda, your opening statement, please.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Thank you, your Honor.

please the Court, Mr. Simms, Mr. Kirkwood.
If I may move this around, Judge?
THE COURT:

Sure.
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If it

MR. ESQUEDA:
courtroom as well?

May I have free access to your

I tend to rove.

I looked at your faces when your names were
called and every jury I—I have, do the same thing. We
understand that feeling, but we—we both appreciate your
being here, taking your time out of your busy lives, your
work, your families, your friends, because it's part of our
system and without you, our system just does not work. So,
I understand that—that desperation.
And an example is that I'm going to give you is,
I have a very good friend who was called to serve as a
juror like you.

She has two small children and her husband

was working out of town.

And the jury that was sat—I

don't even know what the case was, it was not mine. And
she calls me and says, Carlos, is there anything that you
can do to get me out of jury duty?
And I said to her, I said, Jody, no, if I'm
called to jury duty, I have to show up and I have to
breathe a sigh of relief if I'm not called and I have to
moan and groan if I am called.

We appreciate your help

today.
This case is not that difficult of a case and—
and

in respect to other cases that we handle here and the

overall theme of these case is, everyone has to play by
certain rules. And the problem here is, and the facts will
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show that the defendant, Mr. Kirkwood, cannot play by those
rules.
As the Judge has already told you, Mr. Kirkwood
is a convicted felon and that being the case, he didn't
play by the rules.

Then there are special rules that are

imposed on a convicted felon and that is, you give up
certain rights.

One of those rights is to have weapons,

whether to protect yourself or not, you are not allowed to
have weapons.

Knives included.

Playing by the rules.

He has special rules that

he must follow and why we're here today is to show you that
he didn't follow those rules.
Now, on August 30th of last year, 2000, his
A P & P agent, Roberta Hansen, who you met earlier today,
along with another agent—or officer, excuse me Jeremy
Poor, went to his home to conduct a routine search.

That's

part of his probation, that's part of being a convicted
felon and they're there to see if he is in possession or
have in custody or his control any weapons.
They get there, they see that he's in a truck and
his mother's present as well.
of the truck.

They approach, he gets out

And as the facts will show, it's Officer

Poor who approaches the defendant first and they do a patdown search, for their own safety and the safety of the
defendant, to see if he has any weapons on him.
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And again,

that's because of his status as a restricted person; if
you're a convicted felon, you're restricted from being able
to possess these weapons.
They asked Mr, Kirkwood, the defendant, and his
mother if they can search the home.

And that's routine.

That's what happens to you if you're a convicted felon,
people can come into your home and search for weapons.
They both consent.

Even though they don't need consent to

search the house, they can go in without a warrant, that's
part of the restrictions about being a convicted felon.
So, as a result, they enter the home and they
search the home.

They go into the defendant's bedroom and

in the defendant's bedroom, Officer Hansen first notices a
knife, about a four-inch blade with a bone handle, sitting
on a table next to his bed.
Well, that causes her concern and she immediately
takes possession of that weapon.

And she knows that the

defendant is a convicted felon, that he was convicted of
robbery and that he's not allowed to have custody, control
or possession of a dangerous weapon, a knife.
takes that and notifies him.

So, she

He later admits that he knows

he's not supposed to have any weapons.
Shortly thereafter Officer Poor, he sees a canvas
on the floor.

He opens the canvas bag and yet again, there

is another weapon, it's a folding knife with a serrated

21

blade.

He immediately takes Mr. Kirkwood into custody, he

arrests him there and they charge him with possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person because he is a
convicted felon, he cannot have those weapons.
That's why we're here today.

That's why we chose

you to sit as our jurors. Now, it's my job as a prosecutor
to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that that's in
fact what happened.

That he's a restricted person and that

he had in possession or custody and control over two
weapons, each weapon is an offense in itself.

That's two

charges.
And it's based upon the fact that he can't have
those, he has to play by special rules.

You and I can have

those items because we don't have to deal with those
special rules.

But as a part—opportunity to continue in

this community, that's one of the conditions that he has to
abide by and the facts will show that, yet again, he
couldn't abide by those rules.
The legal principles of burden of proof,
reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence are
cornerstone principles of our American justice system.

The

Judge started to give you a great history lesson about it.
I was more interested in that than in selecting you, it was
very interesting, about that person, trial by ordeal, who
had to put the—the hot iron in his hand and walk nine
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paces and if he didn't get burned, he was, what, innocent;
right?
Well, you put something hot, like a hot burning
iron in your hand, you're going to get burned.
what our justice system is all about.

That's not

So, they're placing

upon the prosecution to prove an individual guilcy beyond a
reasonable doubt.
And I believe in that system.

The problem here

is that there is going to be no doubt and remember that any
doubt that you have doesn't justify it, it has to be
reasonable, would a reasonable person have a doubt?

It's a

doubt in your mind that is reasonable.
But when you hear the facts how the agents went
in, justifiably so, found these two knives, placed the
defendant in custody and that's why we're here and when you
hear that evidence, your only conclusion and I'm asking you
to do it, is to find the defendant guilty of possessing a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person.

Two counts.

Thank you.
THE COURT:

Mr. Simms?

MR. SIMMS:

Thank you, Judge, Counsel.

I would like to thank you for serving here today
and I know Mr. Kirkwood would as well. Unlike Mr. Esqueda,
I think it's exciting to be on a jury, I think this is what
the Constitution is all about.
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I think that your service

here today is sort of the lifeblood of our system.
than being sort of down, I'd be up about it.

Rather

I'm really

actually very envious, I've always wanted to be on a jury,
but I don't think that I would be selected.
The prosecution has set up a theme and they said
that he has special rules and I—I think that's true, he is
a felon.

And who told you that?

We stipulated to that.

We're not trying to hide that, today.

They don't have to

prove that, we have given that up.
We—we—he knows who he is, he knows what he's
done in the past, he knows he's been—he's been—he pled
guilty to robbery and part of who he is, is he's on
probation now and he—and—and A P & P is free to go check
his place at any time.

And in fact, what you're going to

hear today is someone who was in his truck, about to back
up and A P & P arrived.
Mr. Poor—the gentleman who is outside the
courtroom right now, you don't see him, he's going to come
in—searched Kirkwood, searched his person, no weapons.
Sure, come on in the house, let's—let's—let's see what's
there.

They looked at all the—it's my understanding they

looked at all the rooms in the house, but first, what they
did is, they went into Mr. Kirkwood's room.
He said, sure, here's my room.
room that I use.

Here—here's the

You're going to see that there's a wash
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room, that there's a closet, that there's a bed and there's
a door with access to the—to the back of the house.
So, what did he do?
room.

He said, sure, this is ray

This is—the same thing, I have nothing to hide and

the officer, the A P & P officials, they saw a knife on the
table.

I eat with a knife, I'm not a savage.

What am I

going to do, eat—eat meat like, you know, with my hands or
something?

Of course, I have a knife in my room, I was

eating in my room, using it to cut tape, using it as a
tool.

They found that knife.

You're going to see it, it's

probably bigger than a standard knife and you'll see it, it
has like a little wooden, sort of a bone-type handle. A
little bit rusty; but you're going to hear from Mr.
Kirkwood, he's going to tell you what he was using that
for.
And you're also going to hear that in, I think—
I believe in a closet, they found this red bag and they
searched through the bag and they found a knife.
people are using that closet in the house.

A lot of

Mr. Kirkwood,

it's—it's not a room that's sort of exclusively his.
Other people have access to that.
You'll see in pictures of the room or
descriptions of the room, that there's a washer and dryer
in there, that maybe other people have stuff in the closet,
maybe it's a shared closet.

He's going to say, that's not
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my knife.
And interestingly also, they found other tools
that were there and I believe that there was a tool box
there.

So, that's what you're going to hear.

And our

stories are going to be in agreement, there's no—there's
no debate.
weapons?

These knives were found, but are they dangerous

No.
Mr. Kirkwood is innocent and you'll find that

out.

This case is very similar to sort of buying eggs at

the grocery store.

You want to pop open that top and look

and see if there's any cracks in any of those eggs and our
position is today that there are a few cracks, when you
really examine what's going on here, when you look at what
Mr. Kirkwood did, are you going to find that he's innocent?
I—I believe so.
And it's interesting, the prosecutor talked about
trial by ordeal.

This—this is an ordeal for Mr. Kirkwood,

it's not easy for him to come in here and—and face you,
but he's willing to do that and we just hope that you'll
hear our side of the story.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. ESQUEDA:
THE COURT:

Your first witness?

Be Roberta Hansen, your Honor.
Please step forward, face the clerk

and be sworn.
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ROBERTA HANSEN,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the
witness stand and was examined and testified as follows:
THE COURT:

Good morning.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Good morning.

State your name, please.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

My name is Roberta Hansen.

Spell your last name.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

H-a-n-s-e-n.

Go ahead, Mr. Esqueda.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR, ESQUEDA;
Q

How are you employed, Officer Hansen?

A

I'm a probation-parole officer with Adult

Probation & Parole, Utah Department of Corrections.
Q

How long have you been a probation-parole

officer?
A

For ten years.

Q

Were you in that position on August 30th of last

year, the year 2000?
A

Yes.

I was.

Q

Now, as a probation officer, what are your

duties?
A

Principally, our duties are to protect the
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community.

Secondary, we are to insure that our clients,

probationers or parolees, are complyinq with the orders by
the courts or the Board of Pardons, depending on their
status•

Secondary, we work in a treatment capacity,

counseling capacity.
Q

Now, are you familiar with the defendant, Kent

Karl Kirkwood?
A

I am.

Q

Do you see him in the courtroom today?

A

Yes.

Q

Could you point him out and describe what he's

wearing today?
A

He's seated at the defense desk.

He's wearing a

blue blazer and a yellow and black tie.
MR. SIMMS:

Your Honor, we will stip to

identification.
THE COURT:

Very well.

Members of the jury, the defense has stipulated
that Officer Hansen has identified the defendant.

You may

accept that as true.
MR. ESQUEDA:
Q

Thank you, your Honor.

(By Mr. Esqueda)

And how do you know Mr.

Kirkwood?
A

He was on probation assigned to my case load.

Q

And what was he on probation for?
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A

A conviction of robbery, a second-degree felony.

Q

Now, on August—I'm going to direct your

attention to August 30th of last year.

Did you go to Mr.

Kirkwood's home?
A

Yes.

I did.

Q

All right.

And do you know where that is

located?
A

It's 45 East Guest Avenue in South Salt Lake.

Q

Is that in Salt Lake County?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

It is.
And what was the purpose of you going to

his address?
A

We were there to conduct a search of his

residence.
Q

Okay.

Is that part of your duties as a probation

officer?
A

It is.

Q

Did you go with a warrant?

A

No.

Q

Why not?

A

A warrant's not required.

It's a standard

condition of probation that he allow a search of his
residence any time day or night.
Q

Okay.

When you arrived at the residence, what

did you first see?
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A

We first saw Mrs, Kirkwood, who was standing by a

gate in the front yard of the house.

We spoke with her,

told her why we were there and asked if we could search the
house.
Q

And what did she respond?

A

She said that we had permission to do so.

Q

What was the next step that you took?

A

As we proceeded into the yard, Mr. Kirkwood

stepped from a truck that was in the driveway.

My partner

then walked over to him.
Q

Did you notice him prior to that time?

A

I did not, no.

Q

Okay.

And who—who went with you to Mr.

Kirkwood's residence?
A

My partner, Officer Jeremy Poor.

Q

And he's an A P & P officer as well?

A

He is.

Q

And Mr.—you say Mr. Kirkwood stepped out of the

truck and did what?
A

He and Mr. Poor spoke briefly.

He allowed Mr.

Poor to pat him down, for officer's safety reasons.
Q

And did you see that?

A

I did.

Q

Okay.

Then—then what happened?

next?
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What did you do

1

A

Then we proceeded into the house.

We walked

2

through the living room, through Mrs. Kirkwood's bedroom

3

and into Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom.

4
5
6

Q

Can you des—could you describe the access to Mr.

Kirkwood's bedroom?
A

The access was either through Mrs. Kirkwood's

7

bedroom or there was a door that led to the outside, near

8

the—a garage or shed.

9

Q

How did you know this area was Mr. Kirkwood's?

10

A

He told us it was.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

He said, This is my bedroom.

13

Q

Okay.

14
15

And how did he describe it to you?

What did you do when you first entered the

bedroom?
A

I checked the bed area.

It's a very small room,

16

there wasn't much room to maneuver and it was very

17

cluttered.

18

weapons or anything else that would be harmful to us, then

19

asked Mr. Kirkwood to sit on the bed.

I checked the bed to make sure there were no

20

Q

Okay.

21

A

For officer safety.

22

Q

Okay.

23

Why were you looking for weapons?

Now, you being his probation officer, i s —

is the defendant allowed to have any weapons?

24

A

He is not.

25

Q

And why is that?
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1
2

A

and also under Federal law.

3
4

Because he's a restricted person under Utah law

Q

So that's—that's based upon his conviction that

you mentioned for the robbery charge?

5

A

It is.

6

Q

And you, at that point in time, you're looking

7

around his bed?

8
9

A

Initially I patted down his bed to make sure

there was nothing in it that would be harmful to us.

10

Q

Did you find anything?

11

A

I did not, in the bed, no.

12

Q

What was your next step?

13

A

I was glancing around the room.

There was a

14

table, as you face the bed, to the right of the bed and on

15

that table was a large knife.

16

Q

Could you describe it?

17

A

It has a blade around four inches, curving on the

18

end and the handle is either wood or bone.

19

Q

Where did you find this?

20

A

It was on a table next to Mr. Kirkwood's bed.

21

Q

What did you do with the weapon?

A

I seized it.

23

Q

Did you ask him any questions about that knife at

24

that time?

25

A

22

I

I did.

I told him he knew that he was not
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supposed to have it, asked what it was doing there.
Q

So, he admitted to you that he knew he wasn't

supposed to have a weapon?
A

He did.

Q

Okay.

A

He said he brought it into his room the night

What was his response to your questioning?

before when he was eating.
Q

Did he say he brought it in from where?

A

I don't believe he did.
MR. ESQUEDA:
THE COURT:

May I approach?

You may.

MR. ESQUEDA:

Your Honor, may I have leave to

approach the witness during the trial?
THE COURT:

That would be fine.

MR. ESQUEDA:
Q

Thank you*

(By Mr. Esqueda) Roberta—Ms. Hansen, I'm

handing you what's been marked as State's Exhibit No. 2.
Do you recognize that?
A

Yes. That is the knife that was on the table in

Mr. Kirkwood's room.
Q

And when you saw that knife, what was the first

thing that you did?
A

I seized it.

I took it by the handle and held

it, for my protection, away from the offender and away from
ray partner.
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Q

Where was Mr. Kirkwood when you recovered that

knife?
A

He was sitting on the bed.

Q

And this—this table that you found this

particular knife, what was it—what was the proximity to
the bed itself?
A

It was right up against the bed.

Q

And this is the same area where Mr. Kirkwood had

previously admitted that's his bedroom?
A

Yes.

It is.

MR. ESQUEDA:

Move to admit State's No. 2, Judge.

MR. SIMMS:

No objection.

THE COURT:

All right*

Exhibit 2 is received in

evidence.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Your Honor, would—could I publish

this to the jury?
THE COURT:
MR. ESQUEDA:

You may.
Just a warning.

Be very careful

with that as you please pass that around.
Q

(By Mr. Esqueda)

After securing that weapon,

what did you do next, Ms. Hansen?
A

I spoke with Mr* Kirkwood*

I reminded him that

he had been told when he signed his probation agreement
that kitchen knives belong in the kitchen and if they were
anywhere else, they would be considered a weapon.
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He

indicated he knew that and understood it.
Q

Did he indicate to you that that was just a

kitchen knife?
A

He did.

Q

Was there anyone else in the room when you

discovered that knife?
A

Officer Poor was.

Q

Okay.

A

And the defendant.

Q

Anyone else?

A

NO.

Q

What did you do after that?

A

We continued to search the room, keeping Mr.

And the defendant?

Kirkwood on the bed.

And Mrs. Kirkwood.

We searched the cupboards under the

bed, the washer and dryer, the closet, the things that were
cluttered around the room.
Q

Now, can you describe this room to the jury?

You

mentioned it was small, but what other items or—well, why
don't you just give a description of what you observed in
that—that room?
A

All right.

Standing in the doorway of the room,

you immediately face the bed.

It is a twin bed.

Immediately to the left is a washer and dryer combination.
The distance between the washer and the dryer and the bed
is a matter of only a couple of feet.
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To the right, as you face the bed, there was a

1
2

table.

3

other things on the floor.

4

room on the far right wall, both of them were—are small

5

closets with door that open out as opposed to sliding

6

doors.

7

Q

8

A

Now, I'm approaching what's been marked as

Yes. That's Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom.

MR. ESQUEDA:

Move to admit Defendant's Exhibit

C.

13

THE COURT:

Any objection?

14

MR. SIMMS:

No.

15

MR. ESQUEDA:

17

THE COURT:

19
20

It's our exhibit so we have no

objection.

16

18

It wasn't

that clean when I was there.

11
12

There are two closets in the

Defendant's Exhibit C; do you recognize that?

9
10

There were a number of items, bags, clothing and

May I publish?

C is received and yes, you may

publish.
Q

(By Mr. Esqueda)

After you conducted your

thorough search, did you uncover anything else?

21

A

Officer Poor did.

22

Q

Were you present when that was uncovered?

23

A

I was.

24

Q

And what was that?

25

A

There was a red gym bag on the floor and inside
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of that bag, he found a folding knife.
Q

Could you describe that knife?

A

It's a—has about a three-inch blade that folds

and locks into the handle.
grip.
Q

The handle has a black rubber

The blade is serrated, primarily on the end.
Were—and did you actually see Officer Poor

obtain that weapon?
A

I saw him take it out of the bag, yes.

Q

I'm handing you what's been marked as State's

Exhibit No. 1.

Do you recognize that?

A

Yes. That's the knife from the red gym bag.

Q

And that's the one that Officer Poor pulled out

of a red gym bag?
A

It is.

Q

Okay.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Q

Move to admit State's No. 1.

MR. SIMMS:

No objection.

THE COURT:

Exhibit l's received.

(By Mr. Esqueda)

was serrated.

You mentioned that the blade

Let's take a look at that—that blade. Is

that—is that actually the blade that was—
A

It is. And you'll notice that it's serrated on

the end there.
Q

Okay.
MR. ESQUEDA:

And your Honor, may I publish?
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THE COURT:
MR. ESQUEDA:
Q

You may.
And it looks sharp, so be careful.

(By Mr. Esqueda)

After this second knife was

located in the defendant's bedroom, what action did you and
Officer Poor take?
A

We told Mr. Kirkwood he was under arrest.

Officer Poor placed him in restraints and he was again
seated on the bed.
Q

Did you have any further discussions about the

second knife, the knife with the serrated blade—
A

Yes.

Q

—with Mr. Kirkwood?

A

Yes.

Q

What was that discussion?

A

Mr. Kirkwood stated that it was not his, he

didn't know it was in the bag and we reminded him that it
was in his bedroom, it was in his possession, it was under
his control.
Q

Did he give you an indication of whose knife that

A

He did not.

Q

At that point in time, what did you do?

A

We continued to search the room.

was?

Officer Poor

asked Mr. Kirkwood if we would find additional knives and
he indicated he had a knife tool, it's a tool with a number
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of blades in that and Mr.—Agent Poor found that and we
also took that into custody.
Q

Was there anything else taken?

A

Yes. There was a second tool, they're commonly

called Gerber tools, has a number of blades, knife blades,
but it also has other tools as a part of the tool.
Q

Now, did you also look in any other rooms in the

home?
A

We did.

We went through Mrs. Kirkwood's room,

with her permission, the bathroom, the living room, the
kitchen, the outside was searched, including the garage or
shed.
Q

Now, did you actually search the kitchen of the

Kirkwood home for any other knives that were similar to
this?
A

I did not.

Q

Did you look in the kitchen at all?

A

I went through the kitchen, I looked on

countertops, I did not go through drawers or cupboards.
Q

In your cursory review of the kitchen, did you

see any other similar knives—
A

I did not.

Q

— a s State's No. 2?

A

Correct.

Q

How about in the kitchen with State's No. 1?
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A

No.

Q

Okay.
MR, SIMMS:

Was that no—no, you didn't see any

or no, you didn't search?
THE WITNESS:

I'm sorry.

No.

I did not see any knives

similar to Exhibit No. 1.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Nothing further, Judge.

THE COURT:

Mr. Simms?

MR. SIMMS:

Thank you, Judge.

CRQSS-EXAMINATIQN
BY MR, SIMMS;
Q

So, when Mr.—when you found the first knife

which is right here, the bigger of the two—
A

Yes.

Q

— M r . Kirkwood said, I was eating?

A

He said he took it into his room when he was

eating.
Q

Okay.

Can felons use knives when they eat?

A

Certainly.

Q

Or—they can?

A

When they're eating.

Q

Okay.

So, it's not a crime to, say, go out to

have a steak dinner and eat with a knife—
A

Of course not.

Q

— i f you're a felon?
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Okay.

And then when the other knife was found, he
immediately said, hey, that's not my bag, that's not my
knife?
A

Yes.

Q

So, let me just go over some—all the events that

took place on that day.

So, you're there on August 30th—

A

Uh huh.

Q

—and you run into Mr. Kirkwood; right?

A

Uh huh.

Q

But you first run into his—his mom; is that

correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

Okay.

And is it this woman you see in the gray

suit on the front row?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

The defendant's mother?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

So, that's Kitty Kirkwood?

And she said, sure, you can look through

the home?
A

She gave us permission, yes.

Q

Okay.

And then you saw Mr. Kirkwood and he was

patted down by Mr. Poor, who discovered nothing on his body
that you could see; right?
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A

That's correct.

Q

And then you—everybody went in the house?

A

That's correct.

Q

Okay.

A

It's fairly small.

Q

Okay.

Is it a big house or a—a smaller house?

MR. SIMMS:

If I may approach the witness, your

THE COURT:

You may.

Honor?

Q

(By Mr. Simms)

Exhibit B.

I'm handing you Defendant's

Is that a—does that look like the same room

that you referred to earlier?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

It does.
It's a little bit cleaner in that picture;

right?
A

Substantially.

Q

Do—do you see a washer and dryer in that

picture?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

And did you ever ask Mr. Kirkwood if—if

people shared the closet with him?
A

I didn't ask him, no.

Q

Okay.

You—you see that doorf there's a door in

that picture; correct?
A

Yes.
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1

Q

And where does that door lead to?

2

A

Outside.

3

Q

Okay.

4

Is that the only sort of back entrance and

sort of in and out?

5

A

Back entrance to the home?

6

Q

Yes.

7

A

As far as I know, yes.

8

Q

Okay.

9

So, there's only one entrance—one exit

out of the back?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Okay.

So you'd have to walk through his room to

12

get through the back, if you want to enter outside the

13

house?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Okay.

16
17

MR. SIMMS: And if I may approach again.
Q

(By Mr. Simms)

If I can just hand you what's—

18

it's marked Defendant's Exhibit E, but do you—do you

19

recognize that?

20
21

A

It is similar to the knife-tool combination that

we seized from Mr. Kirkwood.

22

Q

Okay.

23

A

This—I did not retain a chain of custody on

24
25

So, what w a s —

this, so I cannot say that it is the precise tool.
Q

Okay.

But it looks very similar to you?
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A

It does.

Q

Now, does that have blades?

Could you open up

maybe a blade on that?
A

It could take me a minute.

Q

Just maybe just what about one blade.

A

There's one right there.

Q

Sure.

All right.

There's one.

And that's sort of a—you

described that as a tool?
A

When Mr. Poor asked him if there were other

knives, he described this one, saying where it was located,
saying that he had it.
Q

Saying he had something--

A

This is—this is the third item we found in the

house.

Mr. Kirkwood responded to a question of, is there

other knives by describing this tool.
Q

Okay.
MR. SIMMS:

If I can have continuing permission

to approach—
THE COURT:

You may.

MR. SIMMS:

—the witness.

Q

(By Mr. Simms)

Exhibit F.

I'm handing you Defendant's

Does that look very similar to another item

that you got from the home?
A

It does.

Q

Okay.

Is it the same?
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A

The—the same as the tool we found?

Q

Yes.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

It has numerous blades on it.

Q

Okay.

A

There's a small one.

And does that have a blade on it?

Could you just maybe pull one blade out?

MR. SIMMS:

Your Honor, at this time, we would

move for admission of Defendant's E and F.
MR. ESQUEDA:

No objection.

THE COURT:

Received.

MR. SIMMS:

And if I may publish that to the

jury, your Honor?
THE COURT:

Do you want to move for admission of

MR. SIMMS:

Yes, we would move for that as well,

Exhibit B?

your Honor.
THE COURT:

Any objection?

MR. ESQUEDA:

Q

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

It may be received as well.

MR. SIMMS:

And may I publish B, your Honor?

THE COURT:

You may.

MR. SIMMS:

Thank you.

(By Mr. Simms)

Now, would you agree or disagree,

when you—when someone talks about a common understanding
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of words, when someone talks about a tool, would you agree
or disagree that the following is—is defined as a tool?
Any implement, instrument, utensil held in the hand and
used for cutting, hitting, digging, rubbing, et cetera,
knives, saws, hammers, shovels; would you agree or disagree
that that is the definition of tool?
A

It could be a definition of a tool, yes.

Q

Okay.

Now, do you have people who were on

probation, convicted felons and who work at say, machine
shops?
A

Certainly.

Q

Okay.

And do they come in contact with maybe

things that cut tape or cut rope?
A

Yes.

Q

And is that a—a violation?

A

It is not, as long as the tool is used

specifically as a part of their work and that it is stored
with other similar tools.
Q

So, it's sort of based on use?

A

It is.

Q

Okay.

And I—and I suppose that Mr. Kirkwood

could play baseball; right?
A

Of course.

Q

With—with a bat; but if he used that bat maybe

to sort of hit somebody, then that would be a weapon?
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A

It is specifically discussed with him when he

signs his probation agreement that a baseball bat stored
with recreational equipment and used in that context is a
baseball bat.
Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

So, it's based on the use?

And you—when you saw that knife on the

table, did he ever make a move for it or try to stab
anybody?
A

No.

He did not.

Q

Okay.

So, he never reached for any of the

knives?
A

He did not.

Q

Okay.

And you said that you looked through the

kitchen, but you didn't look through the drawers to see
similar-type knives?
A

I said I did not.

Q

Okay.

A

No*

You did not.

Do you know if Officer Poor

did?
The South Salt Lake officers searched the

kitchen.
Q

Okay.

But a knife in the kitchen wouldn't be a—

wouldn't be a problem, would it?
A

No.
MR. SIMMS:

No further questions.

47

THE COURT:

Any redirect?

MR. ESQUEDA:

Just briefly.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ESQUEDA!
Q

The last two items, Defense Exhibits—Defense

Exhibits F—E and F, you didn't draw any concerns from
these items?
A

I had concerns about them, yes; ordinarily, we

don't allow probationers to carry so much as a pocket knife
on their person.
Q

But you distinguished these items as tools?

A

I did-

Q

As compared to these two items as knives; is that

right?
A

That's correct.
MR. ESQUEDA:
THE COURT:

If we could approach, Judge?
You may.

(Whereupon, an inaudible off-the-record
discussion was held at side bar.)
THE COURT:

Members of the jury, I'm going to

excuse you about five minutes.

We have a legal issue

that's come up, Counsel wants my attention at maybe more
length than it makes sense to whisper here at the bench; so
while we're on this break, please don't discuss the case,
don't form or express any opinion about the case.
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Don't

allow anyone to discuss the case in your presence and be
ready to come back because hopefully, this will just be a
minute.
Please rise as we excuse the jury.
Okay.
argument.

I—I think I understand Mr. Esqueda's

Ordinarily, the nature of the underlying offense

and what was used to commit the underlying offense would be
of no concern in this trial; but the distinction that
you've tried to make here is between these knives—between
knives as weapons and knives as tools.
And it strikes me that Mr. Esqueda has a good
argument that—with respect to Mr. Kirkwood, that he
intended to possess a knife as a weapon because of his use
of a knife in his prior felony.
Let me hear what your response to that is.
MR. SIMMS:

Your Honor# if you look at Page 3 of

State v. TuckerP what I've handed you, it states: A
prosecutor may not parade the details of a prior crime in
front of the jury.

The defendant is subject to cross-

examination only to test his veracity and credibility and
collateral matters should not be taken in; but this case
stands for the proposition that if the defendant opens the
door to something like that, sure, it could become—it
could come in.

But I don't think that another witness

could open the door on that.
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And anyways, I think it's—it's very prejudicial.
I think it's—it's—even if the Court views it as relevant,
I think under 403, it's highly prejudicial, more
prejudicial than probative and I think this case has
already taken a direct—a turn in the wrong way and that
we're—we're really arguing over the probation violation
rather than arguing is he a felon?

Yes. And then, Does he

have a weapon?
And—and we're sort of blending in the two, is it
a probation violation?
THE COURT:

Is it a new offense?

Well, what the statute says with

respect to whether something is a weapon is:

Dangerous

weapon means any item that in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury.

The following factors shall be used in determining

whether a knife or other item, object or thing not commonly
known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon.
And those are, the character of the instrument,
object or thing; the character of the wound produced, if
any; the manner in which the instrument, object or thing
was used and the other lawful purposes for which the
instrument, object or thing might be used.
Now, what you're contending, what you've opened
the door to, I mean, the—the issues that you're making is
that this—this—these knives were not intended to be used
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1

as a weapon, their—their use was for eating or in one

2

case, wasn't even his knife.

3

Why—you know, and making this a big thing about

4

the distinction between—or the fact that a knife can also

5

be a tool, why doesn't that open the door for Mr. Esqueda

6

to say, he in—you know, he—there were—the jury may find

7

that he intended to use them as a knife because in the

8

past, he has used a knife to commit crimes. His use of a

9

knife as a weapon in the past.

10

MR. SIMMS: Well, your Honor—

11

THE COURT: He's not a stranger to the idea that

12

maybe you can cut steak with this, but you can also use it

13

as a weapon.

14

MR. SIMMS: Well, I think that obviously anyone

15

can use a weapon—I mean a knife as a weapon.

16

we need to inform the jury that there was four items taken,

17

I don't want them speculating on—on the other items as

18

being, you know, some type of other type of knife. And

19

actually, in the police report, they refer to it as tool

20

and I want to make the distinction between what is being

21

argued here as being sort of the issue of the knives and

22

these two other items aren't—aren't included in that.

23

Again, it's in the police report that these are tools. I

24

believe that they even said that they found them in a—in a

25

tool box.
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I think that

I—I think that if—I mean, they already know
that he was convicted of a robbery•

They already know a

certain amount of—of Mr. Kirkwood's past.

I think that

the—that it's easy to gain a conviction if we just bring
in everything about Mr. Kirkwood up and—
THE COURT:

Well, that's not what we're about.

MR. SIMMS:

Well—

THE COURT:

What we're about is trying to—I

mean, what—what this requires us to do is really look into
Mr. Kirkwood's mind and determine whether he intended to
possess this knife as a weapon or for some other purpose.
But that's really what it comes down to.
MR. ESQUEDA:
the issue.

And that's what he brought up in

I didn't bring up the other tools. He's the

one who made the definition of the tool and is—is putting
all the exhibits, including my exhibits, the two knives, as
this—part of his broad definition of a tool.
And now, I have evidence to show that that's not
the case here.

And I'd like to bring that forward, and he

opened the door to it.
THE COURT:

This is a really close one, in my

judgment.
MR. ESQUEDA:

I mean, I think the Court hit the

nail on the head when you said, you know, I can bring forth
evidence which shows that he intended to possess these two
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items as knives, not as tools.

And I didn't bring that up,

but Mr. Simms did.
THE COURT:

I guess the concern that—let me have

you address this, Mr. Esqueda.
The concern that is developing in my mind is that
it's mildly probative of his intent, that in his first
crime he used a knife and so therefore, he used a knife as
a weapon in the past and that sheds some light on what his
intent is now; but it's real prejudicial.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Well, I think it's more probative

in the fact, especially since Mr. Simms brought up these
tools, as to why we have a distinction here between two—
two items that are obviously tools and two items that are
not.

And that goes directly to his intent.

Judge.

Directly,

It's more probative than it is prejudicial. Hell,

my whole case is prejudicial against the defendant, but I'm
allowed to bring in probative evidence and this is clearly
more probative, since he opened the door.
You know, I didn't open the door.

If he opened

this and it happens to be prejudicial to his client, that's
his fault, that's not my fault.

And now I'm entitled to

walk through that door.
THE COURT:
down a little bit.

Well, let's—let's just break that

The fact that he's mak—how does it

open the door, the fact that he's trying to distinguish
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between tools and knives—tools and weapons, how does that
open the door t o —
MR. ESQUEDA:
THE COURT:

Well, I —
It does, though, it just does.

Because it really comes down to what is his intent in
possessing these items.
MR. ESQUEDA:
MR. SIMMS:

That's my point, Judge.
Your—your—even if you get past that

hurdle, she has no personal information as to what happened
with his robbery*

Everything is based on sort of hearsay

or what she's heard or—or somehow gathered some
information from a third party, or I don't even know where
she gets this information that a knife was used in the
robbery.

So, I think—
THE COURT:

I think there is the problem with

personal knowledge here.

The fact that she has read the

pre-sentence report doesn't give her personal knowledge.
MR. ESQUEDA:

I suppose we could voir dire right

now and see if she had any discussions with the—
THE COURT:

Let's do that.

Go ahead.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MRt ESQUEDA;
Q

Have you had any discussions with Mr. Kirkwood

about the underlying facts of his prior conviction for
robbery?
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1

A

No.

Only that it was a person and a violent

2

offense and that he would be then on a higher level of

3

probation supervision.

4
5

Q

Did he ever indicate to you that he had used a

weapon in that—in those offenses?

6

A

He did not.

7

Q

How did you gain that information that a weapon

8

was used?

9

A

From the pre-sentence report.

10

Q

Anyplace else?

11

A

No.

12

THE COURT;

13

MR. ESQUEDA:

14

THE COURT:

15

I don't think that's good enough.
Okay, Judge.

You may have—you may be able to get

that some other way, but—

16

All right.

Let's bring the jury back.

17

All right.

We are back on the record with the

18

jury present.

19

important matter that's come up.

20

able to make some progress on it while you were out and

21

that will allow us to continue.

I apologize for that delay.

22

Go ahead, Mr. Esgueda,

23

MR. ESQUEDA:

There was an

I think that we've been

Thank you, your Honor.

24
25
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION

fConfcjnnjni)

BY MR, ESOUEDA;

Q

Now, in your search of the home, you found

Stated No. 2 on this table; is that your testimony?
A

Yes.

It is.

Q

Okay.

Next to this knife that you discovered on

the table, was there any plates or anything like that?
A

No.

There wasn't.

Q

How about any food?

A

No.

Q

Crumbs?

A

I wouldn't know about crumbs.

Q

Okay.

Left-overs?

How about any remnants on the knife

itself, that it had been used for food?
A

No.

There was not.

Q

And the knife, the State's No. 1, the folding

knife with the serrated blade, how about there?

Did—was

there any items of food around that item when it was
discovered?
A

No.

Q

Did you check the knife to see if it had any food

remnants on the blade itself?
A

I—I looked at the blade, I reviewed it.

There

was nothing on it.
Q

And in regards to State's 1 and 2, did the
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defendant ever indicate that he used these as a particular
tool?
A

Only to say that No. 2 was used to eat dinner the

night before.
Q

But yet you didn't find any food items or plates

in his room?
A

NO.

Q

Did the defendant ever indicate to you that h e —

at his employment, that he needed this—these types of
items, referring to State's Exhibits 1—1 and 2?
A

No.

Mr. Kirkwood was unemployed.

Q

Okay.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Nothing further.

THE COURT: All right.

You—Ms. Hansen, you may

step down.
Yes, Mr. Simms?
MR. SIMMS:

I—I don't know if I have any

THE COURT:

I hope you don't because I don't

recross.

generally allow it unless there's some—something new that
comes up on redirect.
MR. SIMMS:

No.

THE COURT:

You may—you may step down.

THE WITNESS:

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. ESQUEDA:

We'd call Officer Poor.
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Step before the clerk and be sworn.
JEREMY GREGORY POOR.
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the
witness stand and was examined and testified as follows:
THE COURT:

Please state your name.

THE WITNESS: My name is Jeremy Gregory Poor.
THE COURT: And spell your last name, please?
THE WITNESS:

P-o-o-r.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Esqueda.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Thank you, your Honor.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ESQUEDA:
Q

Officer Poor, how are you employed?

A

I'm employed by the Department of Corrections,

Adult Probation & Parole.
Q

How long have you been a probation and parole

officer?
A

Approximately eight months.

Q

What was your employment prior?

Was it in

corrections?
A

It was.

I was a security enforcement sergeant at

the Utah State Prison.
Q

And I take it from there as a sergeant at the

prison, you went to A P & P?

58

A

I did.

Q

And were you employed as a probation and parole

officer on August 30th of the year 2000?
A

I was.

Q

Did you have an occasion to be with Officer

Hansen on that date?
A

I was.

Q

And you know the defendant, do you not?

A

I do.

Q

Did you have an occasion to go to the defendant's

residence on August 30th, 2000?
A

Yes, we did.

Q

Uh huh.

Do you remember where that lo—that

residence was located?
A

I have it in my report and I do remember—

Q

Where was that?

A

—the address.
The address is 45 East Guest Avenue.

Q
report.

Now, I noticed that you're looking at your
Is that helping you refresh your recollection?

A

It is.

Q

Okay.

A

It is.

Q

And what was the purpose of going to defendant

And that's in Salt Lake County?

Kirkwood's residence?
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A

To assist Agent Hansen in a home visit.

Q

Is that part of a routine that probation officers

typically engage in?
A

Yes, we do.

Q

And they typically engage that in (sic) with

their probationers; is that right?
A

That is correct.

Q

And the fact that the—you knew that the

defendant was—did you know that the defendant was a
probationer of Ms. Hansen's?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

I did.
Was he yours as well or were you just

assisting?
A

I was just assisting Agent Hansen.

Q

And you're aware that the defendant was—is a

convicted felon?
A

Yes.

I was.

Q

When you arrived at the residence, what did you

first do?
A

As we approached the front of the residence, I

observed Mr. Kirkwood exiting a pickup truck that was
parked in the driveway and I made contact with Mr.
Kirkwood.
Q

What was the nature of that contact?

A

I just identified who I was as I approached him
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as he was getting out of the vehicle.

He wa wearing blue

pants and they kind of started to drop and he grabbed his
waist line.

I asked him to keep his hands where I could

see them.
Q

Where was Ms. Hansen at this time?

Did you see

A

She was—we were approaching together.

her?
She was

off to my—my right-hand side.
Q

So, when you approached the defendant, his pants

were kind of falling down and he went to pull up his pants?
A

Uh huh.

Q

And you told him, Let me see your hands?

A

I did.

Q

What did you do next?

A

I asked Mr. Kirkwood to turn away from me and I

conducted a search of his persons (sic).
Q

What was the purpose of the search?

A

Basically a search for my safety and Mr.

Kirkwood#s.

I checked him for—if he had any weapons on

his person.
Q

Did you find any weapons on his person?

A

I did not.

Q

After you conducted—is that typically called a

frisk?
A

Called a Terry frisk.

61

1

Q

Okay.

2

A

Ms. Hansen explained to Mr. Kirkwood why we were

3

After this frisk, what did you do next?

there and we walked into the house.

4

Q

What was your purpose of going into the house?

5

A

To conduct a probation search.

6

Q

Where, in the house, did you go?

7

A

We went back to the rear of the residence where

8

Mr. Kirkwood's residence—excuse me, where his bedroom is

9

located.

10
11
12

Q

And do you recall how you gained access into Mr.

Kirkwood's residence—or bedroom?
A

Excuse me.

I—we followed Mr. Kirkwood, I followed Agent

13

Hansen and Mr. Kirkwood's mother, I believe, also escorted

14

us in there.

15

Q

Okay.

16

A

In the bedroom.

17

Q

Okay.

18

A

It was Mr. Kirkwood's.

19

Q

How did you know it was Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom?

20

A

That's where Agent Hansen asked him to take us

21
22
23

And you ended up somewhere in the home?

and—and they were talking about his probation at the time.
0

Okay.

Once you—how did you gain access into

that bed—into Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom?

24

A

We followed him.

25

Q

Through—
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A

Oh.

Q

Explain how the house is laid out.

A

Well, the front door is located in the front

room.

Okay.

I'm sorry.

We walked through the front room, that you walk

through the front room down into, I guess what would be the
master bedroom, which is Ms.—the mother's bedroom.

We

walked through the mother's bedroom into Mr. Kirkwood's
bedroom•
Q

Is there any other access into that bedroom?

A

There—later, we learned that there is a door

that leads out to the back yard.
Q

Once you entered Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom, what did

you do?
A

At first, we—or Agent Hansen just talked to him

and then we conducted a search of his bedroom.
Q

And that search was a search to look for weapons?

A

It was.

Q

Where did—what was—what, specifically, did you

do in regards to conducting this search?
A

Agent Hansen was talking to Mr. Kirkwood and she

watched him while I started basically at one corner of the
room and worked around, just searching various locations in
his room.
Q

Okay.

Why don't you describe the room to the

jury?
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A

It's a small, rectangular room.

It had one door,

if you're standing in the doorway facing the room, it had a
doorway to the left going out, outside. And then it had
two doors on the right-hand side of the room which were
both closets. There was also a washer and dryer and some
cupboards on the room.
Q

Showing you what's been marked as Defense Exhibit

B and C; do you recognize that?
A

Yes. That's the bedroom.

Q

Both—

A

Or Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom.

Q

Both of those photos?

A

They are.

Q

Now, when you began your search, did you—did you

ever uncover any weapons at all, yourself?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

I did.
Describe to the jury what you did to

uncover weapons.
A

While I was searching Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom, on

his bedroom floor, there was a red gym bag and in the gym
bag, there was a black and silver folding knife.
Q

Okay.

I'm going to show you what's been marked

as State's Exhibit No. 1; do you recognize that?
A

I do.

Q

And what is that?
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A

That's the black and silver knife that was

located in the red gym bag.
Q

Now, it's a folding knife, is it not?

A

It is.

Q

Was it folded when you located it?

A

It was.

Q

Did you have a chance to open it at all?

A

At the time, I didn't.

Q

Okay.

What did you do with that knife when you

located it in—in the defendant's bedroom?
A

I notified Agent Hansen and I secured the weapon.

Q

How did you secure the weapon?

A

The weapon was in a folded—was folded and I just

secured it on my person.

And then a short time later, I

handed it to Agent Hansen.
Q

How close was this—you described it as a red gym

A

It was.

Q

How close was it to the defendant's bed?

A

The room is a pretty tight room, I mean,

bag?

everything's, I mean, within reach.
Q

So, it's within reach of his bed?

A

It was within reach of his bed.

Q

Now, in the gym bag itself, did you find any

identification?
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A

I did not.

Q

Okay.

A

Not that I recall.

Q

Okay.

A

Just the knife.

Q

Now, were there any other weapons that were

Was there anything else in the gym bag?

Just the knife?

uncovered during that search?
A

After the knife was found, I asked Mr. Kirkwood

if he had any other knives in his room and he asked me if
basically a Leatherman tool, a multi—a multi-purpose tool
counted and he showed me where that was and I secured that.
Q

Were you aware if Ms. Hansen had discovered any

other weapons?
A

After—after discovering the knife, I did learn

that she had recovered a weapon.
Q

Do you know where she recovered that weapon?

A

I do not.

Q

I'm going to approach with what's been marked as

State's No. 2.

Do you recognize that?

A

Yes.

I do.

Q

What is that?

A

That's the second knife that was recovered in Mr.

Kirkwood's bedroom.
Q

Okay.

Now, do you recall whether there was any

food or plates in the bedroom?
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1

A

I don't recall.

2

Q

Okay.

3

After

you secured the knife

that

you

found, State's No. 2, the folding knife—

4

A

Uh huh.

5

Q

—did you notify defendant Kirkwood of—of—of

6

your discovery?

7
8

A

Q

10

knife?

Did he make any statements in regards to that

Did he say it was his?

11

13

And I had Mr. Kirkwood stand up and I

placed him into custody.

9

12

I did.

A

I—he said

the gym bag belonged

to a—to a

friend.

14

Q

Did he indicate the name?

15

A

Not that I recall.

16

Q

Now, when you conducted that search, was there

17

anyone else in that room besides yourself, Ms. Hansen and

18

the defendant?

19
20

A

I believe Ms. Kirkwood was in—in and out of the

room.

21

MR. ESQUEDA:

Nothing further.

22

THE COURT: Mr. Simms?

23

MR. SIMMS:

Yes. Thank you, Judge.

24
25
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CFQSS-SXAMINATIQH
BY MR. SIMMS;
Q

Now, you found this knife; was it in the closet

in that gym bag?
A

No.

It was not.

Q

Okay.

But it's a small room; was it close to the

closet?
A

It was in between the—the bed and I guess the

closet, yes.
Q

Okay.

And Mr. Kirkwood said it's not his bag?

A

Uh huh.

Q

And you found nothing else in there; correct?

A

In the bag?

Q

Yes.

A

No.

Q

Okay.

So, there's nothing but: the knife, so

there's no indication like a driver's license, some type of
mail, some type of papers that would give an idea of whose
bag that was?
A

In the bag?

Q

Okay.

Not that I would recall.

When you pulled that knife out of the bag,

did Mr. Kirkwood ever say, That's not my knife?
A

At the time that I found the knife, I was—I

don't remember—recall exactly what he stated.

My concern

was, at this time, since we found a weapon, for our safety,
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to secure Mr. Kirkwood.
Q

Okay.

And at some point,

another—another

knife

was found, the one that's in front of you, the longer one
with the—sort of the handle?
A

Uh huh.

Q

Did Mr. Kirkwood ever say that he was eating with

that knife?
A

I remember, but not at which point, he did state

it was a kitchen knife.
Q

Okay.

Did he ever say that he was cutting a

piece of tape with it?
A

Not that I recall.

Q

Okay.

A

We did.

Did you also gather up some other items?

MR. SIMMS:
Q

Approach, your Honor.

(By Mr. Simms)

Hand you Defendant's F and E, did

you also—did you also recover those items?
A

Yes.

Q

And where were they?

A

The Leatherman was on the, I guess what he used

as a night stand and the pocket knife was in a tool box.
Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

So, there was a tool box in the room?

Was it—was it like—was there a washer

and dryer in the room?
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A

Uh huh.

Q

Okay.

A

Uh huh.

Q

Okay.

And he said, This is my room?

MR. SIMMS:

No further questions.

THE COURT:

Redirect?

MR. ESQUEDA:
THE COURT:

None, your Honor.

All right.

MR. ESQUEDA:

You may step down.

At this point, the State rests,

Judge.
THE COURT:
lunch break.

At this time, we're going to take our

Let's get back together again at 1:30.

While

we're on this break, don't form or express any opinion
about the case, don't discuss the case with anyone or allow
anyone to discuss the case in your presence.
This is going to seem like a long noon hour, but
we've got some things that we need to do with respect to
jury instructions and other legal issues, so we'll be
working while you're off and we'll see you back in the jury
room at 1:30.
Please stand while we excuse the jury.
Be seated.
There is one—I would like to express myself more
fully on the evidentiary issue that came up with respect to
whether or not Mr. Esqueda is entitled to put on evidence
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of the prior crime involving a knife.
First—the first question that I — I have

to

address is whether or not that's relevant to all of these
proceedings and it seems to me that it is relevant, it's
not overwhelmingly relevant.

What—the—the issue that

we're trying to decide in this case is whether or not Mr.
Kirkwood's possession of a knife was intended to be
possession of a weapon or possession of a tool.
If you had a hundred people, hundred convicted
felons that all had in their possession a knife, I think
that the intent to possess that knife as a weapon would be
somewhat greater

for

those

felons

who had used knives

in

prior crimes. And so for that reason, I find it to be
relevant.
The next issue is whether the relevance of that
information is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect on this case.

And it's not prejudicial just because

it helps the State establish its case, it has to be
unfairly prejudicial.
Now, we've already admitted in this case that Mr.
Kirkwood is a convicted felon.
prejudice

that

Mr. Kirkwood

Nine-tenths of the

suffers

as a result

of

this

information coming in, he already suffers as the result of
the fact that one of the elements in this case is his prior
conviction of a felony and that's been admitted.
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The additional prejudice that he res—that he
experiences as a result of the jury learning that that
prior conviction involved the use of a knife is only a
slight increase in prejudice and really, it does go to
establishing his intent with respect to the possession of
these items. And I think it's made more relevant in this
case and Mr. Esqueda has talked about opening the door.
The relevance is—of that information is
increased in this case in light of the defense's arguments
that this is but one of a number of tools that Mr. Kirkwood
possessed and he did not intend to possess it as a weapon.
We dodged the bullet with respect to Ms. Hansen's
testimony because I ruled that with respect to her
testimony, she lacked sufficient persohal knowledge to make
that—to testify, as far as the circumstances of the prior
crime.
That still may come up in other context and for
that reason, Mr. Simms, I think that you want to think
carefully about whether or not Mr. Kirkwood should testify
because he obviously has information about—he has personal
knowledge with respect to his prior crime.
Do either of you want to say anything else—
Yeah, please keep that cell phone off during the
course off—
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
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I thought it was turned

off*

I'm sorry.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Well, I—I think that's my claim.

If we're talking about personal knowledge and the defendant
takes the stand, I think I'm going to be entitled to ask
him about the underlying facts of the robbery.
THE COURT:

Now, you—you brought to my

attention, Mr. Simms, the case of State vs. Tucker.
looked over that case.

I have

This case deals with what's

appropriate under 609, which is impeachment, use of a prior
crime for impeachment.

We would not be, although Mr.

Esqueda may well impeach Mr. Kirkwood by use of the prior
crime, I would not allow discussion of the knife to come in
for purposes of impeachment.

I'm only allowing the knife

to come in for whatever relevance and whatever light that
it may shed on Mr. Kirkwood's intent with possessing these
particular items. And—and—and in that way, this
circumstance is distinguished from Tucker.
MR. SIMMS:

Okay.

Your Honor, we simply weigh

the balance of prejudice the heavier—sort of stronger than
the Court and we understand the Court's position, but ours
just differs and that's simply it.
THE COURT:

I understand that, Mr. Simms, but I

wanted to make clear for the record the basis of my ruling.
Do either of you have anything else that you'd
like me to address before we break for lunch?
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MR. SIMMS:

I—I do have a directed verdict

motion, your Honor, because—
THE COURT:

I'd be happy to hear it.

MR. SIMMS:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Just don't belabor it.

MR. SIMMS:

Well, I—I think that there hasn't

been sufficient evidence to prove Count 1 or Count 2.
Again, we would argue that the element of a dangerous
weapon hasn't been made.

We argue that it's a—simply a

tool.
THE COURT:

Understood and overruled.

Let's get back together at about 1:00 o'clock,
would that be acceptable, to talk about jury instructions?
MR. SIMMS: Yes.
MR. ESQUEDA:
THE COURT:

Fine.

Why don't you just come here to the

courtroom and we'll bring you back to my chambers.
We'll be in recess until then<,
MR. ESQUEDA:

Thank you, Judge.

(Recess•)
THE COURT:

Let's go on the record in the matter

of the State of Utah versus Kirkwood.

Mr. Kirkwood's

present, both counsel are present, we're outside the
presence of the jury.
Now would be the time, Counsel, to make any
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1

record you'd like to make with respect to the jury

2

instructions.

3

Mr. Simms?

4

MR. SIMMS:

Your Honor, I would object that the

5

two jury instructions relating to the right to bear arms

6

have not been included and that's the only exception we

7

take to the jury instructions.

8

THE COURT: Very well.

9

Mr. Esqueda?

10

MR. ESQUEDA:

11

THE COURT: All right. Let's see if we have a

12

The State has none, your Honor.

jury ready.

13

THE BAILIFF:

14

Please be seated.

15

THE COURT: The record will reflect that the jury

16
17

Please rise for the jury.

is now present.
Mr. Simms, this would be your chance to call any

18

witnesses you choose to call?

19

MR. SIMMS:

20
21
22
23

witnesses.

Your Honor, we choose not to call any

We would rest.

THE COURT: Very well.

Then we'll proceed to

jury instructions in this case.
Members of the jury, this is probably not going

24

to be your favorite part of the trial, because I'm now

25

going to instruct you in the law which governs your
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deliberations.

And what that involves is my reading to you

a number of rather involved statements of the law that are
in language that is sometimes difficult to follow.

Don't

try and write down everything I'm going to tell you because
I#m going to provide you with this copy of the jury
instructions that you can take with you into the jury
deliberation room.

It's probably better to—to just try

and focus on what's being said and—and get the general
sense of the instructions and then if you have questions
during the course of your deliberations, you can refer to
the instructions themselves.
(Whereupon, the jury instructions were read to
the jury but not transcribed.)
THE COURT:

Mr. Esqueda, your closing argument?

MR. ESQUEDA:

Thank you, your Honor.

If you really believe that these aren't dangerous
weapons, then you need to acquit this man; but simply
because you walked through the courthouse doors doesn't
mean you lose all your common sense.
these weapons.

Okay?

These are dangerous weapons.

Take a look at
It's obvious.

There's an allegation that this is a kitchen
knife.

It's a pretty unique kitchen knife.

feel it, take a look at its condition.

Hold this,

Is this really a

kitchen knife?
How about this one?
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A folding blade, serrated

1

edge.

2

don't want you walJc out of here thinking, I can't use ray

3

common sense, we're in a court of law.

4

You have to rely on what you bring in here, and you bring

5

here, you bring your common sense.

6

weapons.

7

Is this a tool?

This isn't merely a tool and I

No, that's wrong.

These are dangerous

The other aspect of this case is whether the

8

defendant can have possession or have custody or control

9

over these items.

10

Judge, if I may, could I pull out that—

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. ESQUEDA: Judge,

13

You're welcome to.

to be able to see that.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. ESQUEDA:

16

I realize

you*re

not going

Is that going to cause you—

No, that's fine.

I understand.

I have to prove, as the prosecutor,

these elements.

17

Can you all see that?

18

And this is an instruction that the Judge

19
20

actually read to you.
Before you can convict the defendant, Kent Karl

21

Kirkwood of the offense of possession of a dangerous weapon

22

as charged in Count 1 of the Information, you must find

23

from all of the elements and beyond a reasonable doubt,

24

each and every one of the following elements:

25

That on or about the 30th day of August, 2000.
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That's what we've been talking about,
about the date.

Ms* Hansen talked

Mr. Poor, he talked about that date.

In Salt Lake County.

We've described the

residence and its location within Salt Lake County.

We've

met that burden so far.
Was it in the State of Utah?

Obviously.

The defendant, Kent Karl Kirkwood, possessed or
had under his custody or control a weapon.
that the real question?

Did he?

Is

Well, what is custody or control?

What is possession?
The Judge read you an additional instruction.
Can you see that?
You're instructed that possession means a joint
or individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding,
retaining or belonging or maintaining.

For a person to be

a possessor of a dangerous weapon, it is not required that
a person be shown to have individually possessed.
What does that mean?

Okay?

Let's stop right there.

When Jeremy Poor, the officer here, he first
approached the defendant on the outside, he did a pat-down
search.

We all agree there was no weapon on the defendant

at that time.

This instruction says it doesn't have to be

on his person.

These weapons didn't have to be in his

pocket.

They didn't have to be here and when they

Okay?

patted him down, Oh, that's where it is. No.
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That's not

1
2

the law.
What it says is, the dangerous weapon, but it is-

3

-but it's sufficient that it's shown that he joined or

4

participated with one or more persons in the possession or

5

control of a dangerous weapon, with the knowledge that that

6

activity was occurring.

7

Actual physical possession is not necessary to

8

convict the defendant of possession of a dangerous weapon.

9

Conviction may be based—may also be based upon

10

construction possession.

11

where the dangerous weapon is subject to the defendant's

12

dominion and control.

13
14

Construction possession exists

All the evidence shows where the evidence—where
the weapons were found.

Do we have the pictures?

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. ESQUEDA:

17

This is his bedroom.

Right here.
Thank you, Judge.
These are defense exhibits,

18

they call it his bedroom, this is where he sleeps; in fact,

19

he even admits, the State's No. 2, Oh, yeah, I was using

20

that to eat.

21

no plates, there were (sic) no food, she couldn't tell if

22

there were any crumbs, she didn't look that closely for

23

crumbs; but what she did find was this weapon.

24

dangerous weapon.

25

But according to Ms. Hansen here, there were

This is a

This weapon is commonly referred to as a pig
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sticker on the street.

This is not a steak knife.

You

don't cut meat with this, it's a weapon that you use
against another individual.

It is not a tool.

To find that the defendant had constructive
possession of a dangerous weapon, it is—it is necessary to
prove that there is sufficient nexus or connection between
the accused and the dangerous weapon to commit an inference
that the accused had both the power and intent to exercise
the dominion and control.
Again, it's back in the bedroom.

He admits to

State's 2. Oh, yeah, I knew I had that but that's just a
kitchen knife.

Common sense.

Is it a kitchen knife?

What he doesn't admit to is No. 1.
of mine, that's his bag.

Oh, a friend

Officer Poor, he says he found

this knife in this gym bag, the red gym bag.
In the defendant's bedroom.

Where was it?

Where was it in the bedroom?

Oh, I'd say within arm reach of the bed.
But the defendant's own words, he says, well, I
didn't know about it, he was my friend.
friend?
from?

Does he state who?
Is that reasonable?

Did he see where he got it
Again, common sense.

Control and dominion.
all about.

That's what this case is

It's not on his person but it's in his control.

Do you know what this is like?
bank.

Well, which

It's like money in the

Do you have any money that's in your bank account
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right now on you?

No, you don't.

I don't.

But you may

have a checkbook or a credit card and that checkbook has
access to your account in the bank, but the fact that it's
not on your person, does that mean that that money in the
bank is not yours?

No.

that way from you.

Same thing applies to these dangerous

weapons.

It is yours. And no one can take

They're the defendant's, it's in his bedroom.

Okay.
That such weapon was a dangerous weapon.
been all through that.

We've

The other thing that there was a

stipulation on that we had to show that he is a restricted
person, that he is a convicted felon and he's never denied
it.

The stipulation shows that he agrees he was convicted

of robbery.

That makes him a convicted felon and that

logically follows that he cannot possess, whether actual
possession or through exercising dominion or control, over
these weapons.
Because remember what I told you in opening
statement?

I said, this is about playing by the rules. We

all have to play by the rules—I shouldn't wave these
around, it's kind of scary.
We all have to play by the rules.

You do.

I do.

Including the defendant, but you know what, the defendant
had more rules to abide by than you and me. His rights are
restricted by the nature of his conviction and he can't
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have these in his bedroom, he can't have them in his car,
he can't have them on his person because if he does, he's
committed a new offense.

And that's possession of a

dangerous weapon by a restricted person.

When you're a

convicted felon, you can't do that.
But yet again, that shows he can't follow the
rules, he couldn't follow the rules the first time 'cause
he is a convicted felon, and then they placed more rules on
them to try to curb his behavior and what happens?
still can't do it.

He

That's what this case is all about,

playing by the rules.
If I have to do it, if you have to do is, so does
he.

And he has more of an obligation to show us that he

can't do these actions, he can't perform what we can and
that is, have these on our person, have them in our
bedroom.
We've met all the elements that are here for both
counts.

Count 2 is the same—same facts, same scenario,

same elements, just that there are two knives.
Now, the defense got up on the cross-examination
of our witnesses and tried to make a distinction between
Defense No.—or Defendant's Exhibit E and Defendant's F.
And is there a distinction?
with this?

Perhaps.

Could they have charged him

Could I have said, well, there's some

blades in here, is it a weapon?
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But I still use my common

1

sense as a prosecutor as well.

Officer—or Agent Poor—Officer Poor, he called

2
3

this a Leatherby, I believe.

4

Leatherby is.

5

to me.

6

Absolutely.

7

This is a tool.

I don't even know what a

Looks like a unique kind of pair of pliers

Is there a distinction between that and these two?
These are weapons.

How about this one?

This is a tool.

Screw driver, some scissors,

8

well, there's a blade on there, I guess you could clean

9

your nails with that.

Again, the distinction.

A tool or a

10

dangerous weapon?

11

didn't charge him with this stuff, because we used our

12

common sense and we know the difference between a dangerous

13

weapon and a tool.

14

There is a distinction, that's why we

Dangerous weapon means any item that is, in the

15

manner it's used or intended use is capable of causing

16

death or serious bodily injury.

17

death, serious bodily injury?

18

your common sense.

19

Think that could cause

How about this one?

Use

In construing whether an item, object or thing

20

not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous

21

weapon, the character of an instrument, object or thing,

22

the character of the wound, if any, and the manner in which

23

the instrument, object or thing was used (inaudible)

24

determinative.

25

sense to decide if these are actually tools or perhaps a

All you have to use in using your common
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1

kitchen knife or can these inflict this kind of—of injury,

2

serious bodily injury?

3

No injury was inflicted on this case and we're

4

not saying that—that officers were stabbed.

5

saying that this—these items could have done that and

6
7

(that's exactly why he can't possess them because he hasn't
shown that he can be responsible.

8
9
10

We're just

Simply by possessing these, having them in his
custody or control indicates that he's irresponsible.
also indicates that he's guilty of these offenses.

11

I have the burden of proof.

I'm the prosecutor

12

and that's my job.

13

committed this crime, beyond a reasonable doubt.

14

that we met all of these elements beyond a reasonable

15

doubt.

16

I have to show that the defendant

Looking at the facts of the case.

17

witnesses testify; right?

18

probation search because that's their job.

19

defendant outside, patted him down.

20
21
22

It

That h e —

We—we had two

They went in to do a regular
They met the

No weapons.

They went

I in and did a search of the bedroom and these are the items
that they found.
How much more do you need?

I don't think you

23

need anything more.

You have two officers, one with

24

extensive service, one has service at the prison and now

25

again as a probation officer, who find these and know that
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1

I this is dangerous, this violates the law.

2

I

3

|Well, he admits to a kitchen knife and I used that, but is

4

I it really a kitchen knife?

Did he intentionally or knowingly possess them?

He denies the folding knife,

5

but yet, is the explanation reasonable to the officer?

Oh,

6

la friend gave it to me, but I don't know which friend.

He

7

never says to the officers, it's his, (inaudible) still in

8

the bedroom.

9

What other conclusion can you reach?

Don't lose sight of common sense on this case

10

because common sense tells you that the defendant is

11

guilty.

It doesn't take great thought.

It doesn't take an

12

endeavor into the philosophies of life.

He's a man who was

13

convicted of robbery, a convicted felon, and he's found

14

with two knives in his bedroom.

15

evidence that suggests otherwise.

16
17

And there is no other

And based upon that, I'm asking you to find the
defendant guilty.

Thank you.

18

THE COURT:

Mr. Simms?

19

MR. SIMMS:

Yes. Thank you.

20

You could leave it up there; can I use them?

21

MR. ESQUEDA:

22

MR. SIMMS:

Sure.

Thanks, Judge.

Counsel.

And I thank

23

you and I know Mr. Kirkwood also thanks you for your

24

patience today in listening to us.

25

This case is about two things:
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Did Mr. Kirkwood

1

do something wrong and did he know it was wrong when he did

2

it?

3

No.

I—I'd say no.

Again, this case is just like

ithose eggs you buy at the grocery store.

You can't judge a

4

book by its cover, you have to look a little bit deeper.

5

Just like when you go to the store, you have to open up and

6
7

I see if those eggs are cracked.
It's interesting that we stipulated and admitted

8

that Mr. Kirkwood is on probation and is a felon.

It's

9

never been an issue at all; but notice how many times the

10

prosecution mentioned that in the closing argument.

11

interesting that that's not even an issue and we've

12

admitted that.

13

understands and he—he's a convicted felon and he can't

14

It's

That's totally something that he

I have a dangerous weapon.

That's true; but everybody here

15

said that they could give him the presumption of innocence.

16

Just because he was convicted of a felony—no one raised

17

their hand and said, Oh, because he's a felon, he's guilty

18

of this as well.

19

That's—that's not what we're here to do.

He—he is on probation and you've heard his

20

probation officers talk.

21

admitted having it; but what did he say?

22

was eating with it, using it as a tool.

23

evidence that he wasn't?

24
25

He—he had the knife. He
He was eating, he
Do you have any

The probation officer herself said, well, sure,
you can eat with a knife.

No one said you can't.
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You can

1

have a steak dinner, you can—you're not supposed to eat

2

like a savage now that you can't possess that and also you

3

heard from Officer Poor.

4

gym bag, that's not my knife.

5

What did they say?

Have they provided you any evidence that this was

6

his knife, that he knew of it?

7

that bag?

8

clothes that were his?

9

gym bag?

10

That's not ray

Was there anything else in

Was there any mail that was his?

Was there any

Was there anything else in that red

No. Just this knife.

It could have been

anyone's knife.

11

If you look at those pictures and they—they are

12

our pictures, we're not trying to hide anything, we're

13

presenting all that evidence to you today and that's why we

14

wanted to bring out those two leather tools, too. We want

15

you to know everything that happened and we're not hiding

16

anything and that's why we said he's on felony probation.

17

We admitted that from the start.
These other things, a washer and dryer.

18

People

19

have common access to that house, it's not a very big

20

house.

Other people had access to that room.

21

knife.

Is there any indication that it is?

22

all.

23

It's not my
No.

None at

And let me look at what should be 5 and 6 on your

24

jury instructions and the prosecution—prosecution made

25

reference to this. And this is going to be 5 and 6—5 and
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1

6 when you go back and deliberate.

2
3

This is what he's charged with, we've admitted
|that, we know who he is, he was on probation; but look at

4

No. 2.

5

anything, he said, Come on into my house, come on into my

6

! room.

(Inaudible) having possession.

Sure, this is in his room.

7

He never did

He admits that.

He doesn't admit to this, but even assuming that

8

they were—he knew about them, which he never stated that

9

he knew about this and he stated—he said that's not his;

10

but assuming that they meet that second burden, that he

11

should have known or—or intentionally knew that it was

12

there, it's—it's not a dangerous weapon.

13

And let me point your attention to what we

14

(inaudible) I believe No. 9, when you go back and you look

15

at your jury instructions, look at the definition.

16

see, there's two different things going on and I think it's

17

been confused.

18

then he has a new offense and that's what the prosecution

19

called it, the new offense, and then there's two different

20

things going on here, and this is possession or possessed,

21

possession of a weapon.

22

You

He's on—he's had a probation violation and

It's important not to get these two things

23

confused.

Probation officers usually—used to violate

24

somebody based on probation.

25

he violated the terms of probation because he had a kitchen

We're not talking about that
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1

I knife in his bedroom.

2

| And that's, I think, a lot of the part where the probation

3

jofficer's coming from.

4

That's not what we're talking about,

Now, is it a new offense?

This is from the State

5

Legislature, not from special rules that the—that A P & P

6

I gets to determine, this is what the legislature says. And

7

the legislature says, right here, it's 5 and 6, this is

8

what they say you need to prove and you need to prove that

9

it's a dangerous weapon.

10

And what does the legislature say?

11

know, if we had to list everything that was a dangerous

12

weapon, I mean, the—the list would be endless; because if

13

you think about it, how do you know what a dangerous weapon

14

is?

15

They say, you

It's based simply on its use.
Don't be—the prosecution is right.

Don't leave

16

your common sense at the courthouse steps. Use that—that

17

common sense in, how is this used?

18

be a weapon, like this pen.

19

somebody in the eye, of course, that would cause serious

20

bodily damage, it would cause injury; if you stab somebody

21

in the neck in the right spot, he could die.

22

say, because this could be used as a weapon that Kirkwood

23

can't hold a pen now?

24
25

A lot of things could

I mean, you could stab

So, are we to

Or, are we to say that—and this often happens,
people get in a fight, argument or whatever and they use an
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1

automobile to run somebody over or attack them.

2

automobile is often used as a dangerous weapon and it's

3

That

j treated as such; so because something has the potential to

4

be a dangerous weapon, does that mean that he can't—he

5

can't drive a car now?

6

world?

7

dark room or something and not exist and not live because

8

he's a felon?

9

as a knife.

That we're going to limit the whole

That he's going to just, I don't know, stay in a

No, he can live, he can eat, he can use this

Roberta said that he could, that he could eat

10

a steak dinner, that he could play baseball, but he can't

11

use that as a bat to injure someone.

12

use.

13

It's all about the

And don't—don't leave that common sense behind.
If he had a tool box in his room, other tools.

14

You see what he's doing here, he has tools and this is just

15

one of them.

16

(inaudible) you understand the definition of tools, a knife

17

is included in that.

18

again, it's based on use because the State Legislature

19

knows, every object could be a weapon; again, the pen, the

20

car, the baseball bat.

21

it's not unless it's used in that fashion.

22

If you look at the definition of tools,

A knife is included in that. And

Everything could be a weapon, but

Now, if he went out on the street, get into an

23

argument with this knife, you know, and everybody's waiting

24

for this knife (inaudible) it was just on the table, that's

25

where it was.

This—this weapon right here, if not used,
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doesn't have interest, it has no power unless you give it
that, unless you use it.
Again, I think if you go back and you look at
what the State Legislature demands you find, it's not a
dangerous weapon, he didn't use it in that way, he used it
in the way that one would use a tool, to eat with. Of
course, it could be a weapon, but a lot of other things
could be a weapon, too, and he can possess a pen, he can
possess a bat, he can possess a car, but if he uses it in
the wrong way, then he may be guilty of the offense.
In America, the United States, you don't punish
someone based on the potential, based on "this could
happen", "this is a hypothetical."
here.

There was no injury

The officers weren't harmed, there was no wound.

It

talks about that when you look at a dangerous weapon and
(inaudible) item, object, how we know it's a dangerous
weapon, the character of the instrument, object or thing,
the nat—the—the character of the wound, if any, the
manner in which the object was used, for eating, or a tool.
So, it's sort of—you sort of judge a tree based
on what type of fruit it bears.

If—if you pull down an

apple, then it's probable an apple tree and again, if it's
not used as a weapon, then it's not a weapon.
And it's—the Judge—the Judge opened it up—up
this trial and said, the State has the burden of proof and
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1

they do have the burden of proof.

2

trial by ordeal and it sort of had, in the past, there's

3

been a presumption that someone was guilty when they do

4

something and that's what he's talking about, in a trial of

5

ordeal, when they tied you in a sack and threw you in the

6

river and if you drowned, well, then I guess you were—you

7

were guilty.

8
9

And he also talked about

There's no presumption that someone has done
something.

I think that in this case, it's a tough fact

10

that he's a—a felon and we—we admit that but don't hold

11

that against him.

12

he's done nothing wrong here.

13

times that that fact is mentioned, when it's not even an

14

issue, when we're already admitted that.

15

Let him move forward with his life and
And just notice how many

And again, when you think about what the statute

16

requires, it's not found here.

17

weapon and it's not a dangerous weapon and please don't

18

leave your common sense at the door.

19
20

He—he didn't use it as a

And my client is innocent and we do expect a—a
not guilty verdict.

21

THE COURT:

Rebuttal, Mr. Esqueda?

22

MR. ESQUEDA:

Yes, your Honor.

23

have the burden, I get two shots; okay?

24

works in our system.

25

And since I do
That's the way it

Interesting, he's charged in an Information—do
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you all know what an Information is?
document.

It's a charging

The Judge read you the preliminary instructions

and that's how we do things in Utah.

We could have a grand

jury, call in a grand jury and present evidence and the
grand jury decides whether we can charge someone.

Or you

can do it this way, which we commonly use, it's an
Information.
The Information alleges, Count 1, possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person.

And I'm going to-

-I'm not going to read all of it 'cause you can read it
back there; but it says that the defendant, Kent Karl
Kirkwood, did have in his possession or under his custody
or control, a dangerous weapon, to-wit:

a knife, and that

the defendant was on parole or probation for a felony.
We've already dealt with the probation and felony
stuff.

Does it say anywhere in here that he has to use the

knife?

Anybody hear that?

Because it's not there. He

doesn't have to use the item.
By their definition, he could freely walk with it
in his pocket all folded up.

Is that using it?

There's

nothing in this crime that says he has to use this item.
It's possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person, not use of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person.
What they're talking about use is in regard to

93

how he described a dangerous weapon, two-fold.

It's either

by the use of that manner or by the thing's intended use.
Okay?

The manner of its use.

is this made for?

Not how we use it, but what

How is this thing going to be used?

Not

that he used it; otherwise, it would be a different crime.
It would be use of a dangerous weapon, not simply
possession.
And guess what?
of this knife?

What is the common sensical use

Cutting steak?

use of this particular item?
it, but what is it?

What is the common sense
Its manner, not how he used

And are we really using heavy—is he

really cutting a steak with this thing?

Look at the rust .

on here, look at how it's been dulled or cut, feel this.
Common sense.
This is not a case of use, it's a case of
possession and we've shown that because those things were
found in his bedroom.
Defense counsel gets up and says, Well, I can use
this pen as a dangerous weapon.

I could.

But what is the

manner of its use?

The manner of its use is the thing

itself, to write.

And that's how you've got to compare

these items with this item if that's the analogy he's going
to use.
You know, there—there are two types of evidence;
direct and circumstantial evidence.
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I guess the direct

evidence in this case should be that the defendant, we
caught him using the knife, attacking someone.
have that.

We don't

In fact, we've never alleged that; but the

circumstantial evidence is that we found those in his
bedroom.
And it reminds me of a story of my children, we
have two boys, and we have a yard and it has a lot of dirt
in it. And in the winter months, with rain and snow, it
gets pretty muddy and we tell the boys to stay out of the
mud.
Well, my youngest, he—he minds pretty well.
It's my middle child, it's always the middle child, my
little problem child.

I come home from work and there are

footprints all up our stairs leading to our bedroom.

I see

a pair of shoes outside and I recognize that shoe—those
shoes as my youngest child's, covered with mud.
I look back up the stairs. And so what do I do,
I yell out to my children:
the house?

All right, who dragged mud into

And what do kids always do?

don't know.

I love it. "I

I didn't do it".

Okay.

I'd love to meet this person "I don't

know" because he does a lot of stuff in my house.
do I do?

So, what

I follow the mud tracks up the stairs, into the

hallway, down the hall and into a bedroom, which happens to
be my middle child's bedroom.

95

Do I see the shoes there?

No.

No.

The shoes

aren't there, but there's mud—there's mud on his bedroom
floor, on the carpet; of course, we have a light-colored
carpet, that's why it's a big deal to not drag mud into the
house.
So, what do I do?

I kinda look around now in the

bedroom and this is what happened:
their shoes away.
the shoes?
shoes?

But what happened this time?

Put away in the closet.

The mud.

My children never put
Where were

And what was on the

So, what's the reasonable conclusion?

That my middle child, circumstantial evidence, dragged mud
into the shoes—or in—mud into the room on his shoes•
Guess what?
were they found?

Same context applies.

Okay?

Where

He did not have them in his possession,

but there's mud all over the defendant's bedroom and it's
sitting before you.
Please convict him.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Counsel, approach.

(Whereupon, an inaudible discussion was held at
side bar.)
THE COURT:

I'm going to give you one additional

instruction, members of the jury*

In the instructions that

I provide you, there really isn't a good way to distinguish
between Count 1 and Count 2, but it so happens that the
exhibits are—are marked Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2.
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So, for

purposes of your deliberations, assume that Exhibit 1
relates to Count 1 and Exhibit 2 relates to Count 2.
Any questions about that?
All right.

Let's swear the bailiff.

(Whereupon, the bailiff was duly sworn by the
clerk of the Court.)
THE COURT:

Here's the instructions and each of

the exhibits is there, so you're to take with you Exhibits
1 and 2, C, B, E and F and I think that they're all right
there.

Why don't you close them up before you take them?
And we'll stand as the—as the jury leaves us for

what may be the last time.
Be seated.
Anything else, Counsel?
MR. SIMMS:

Judge, I guess there was one concern,

although it—I—I'm not—I—it—it's there.

Okay.

We

couldn't remember whether you instructed them to pick a
foreperson, but it's in the instructions, so you must have.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

All right.

Where are you going to

be, Mr. Esgueda?
MR. ESQUEDA:

Well, wherever you want me to be,

Judge•
THE COURT:

I want you to be where we can get you

within—here within five minutes.
97

MR. ESQUEDA:

I'd be at my office.

THE COURT: Can you do that within five minutes?
MR. ESQUEDA:

I can.

THE COURT: Do you have a cell phone?
MR. ESQUEDA:

I don't.

I have my office line,

it's a direct line to me.

THE COURT: Okay. Make sure that Jill has that.
MR. ESQUEDA: Okay.
THE COURT:

Where are you going to be, Mr. Simms?

MR. SIMMS:

I will probably stay here.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. ESQUEDA:

Did you want us to stay here for

awhile before we leave?

THE COURT:
MR. ESQUEDA:

I think that's a good idea.
Okay.

THE COURT: And we will be in recess and will let
you know as soon as we hear anything.
(Recess.)
THE COURT: We are back on the record in the
matter of the State of Utah vs. Kirkwood.

Mr. Kirkwood is

present, both counsel are present and the jury is present.

Ms. Kirby, are you the foreperson of the jury?
MS. KIRBY:

I am.

THE COURT: And you have a verdict, I understand?
MS. KIRBY: We do.
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1
2

THE COURT:

Would you please hand it to the

bailiff?

3

I'll ask the defendant to please rise.

4

Possession of a—I'll read the whole thing.

5

We, the jurors in the above case, find verdicts

6
7
8
9
10

against the defendant, Kent Karl Kirkwood, as follows:
Count 1, possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, not guilty.
Count 2, possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, guilty.

11

And it's signed by Ms. Kirby, the foreperson.

12

Anybody request polling of the jury?

13

MR. ESQUEDA:

14

MR. SIMMS:

15

THE COURT: Anything else that we should do

No, your Honor.

No, your Honor.

16

before we discharge the jurors?

17

MR. ESQUEDA:

18

THE COURT:

19

Members of the jury, we're going to thank you for

I don't know of anything.

All right.

20

your service at this time, for the day that you've spent

21

with us and your efforts in resolving this case.

22

The bailiff is going to show you one more time to

23

the jury deliberation room.

In just a moment, I'll come

24

back there to meet with you and if any of you have any

25

questions, I'll answer them and I'll thank you more
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1

personally.

2
3

Please stand as we excuse the jury for the last
time.

4

Be seated.

5

Mr. Kirkwood, you've been found guilty of the

6

charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted

7

person.

8
9

I'm going to request that prior to sentencing,
that we receive a pre-sentence report from A P & P.

I'm

10

going to set this case for sentencing approximately 45 days

11

out.

12

just over 45 days; you waive maximum time?

Let's do that on March 12th at 8:30.

That may be

13

MR. SIMMS:

We would waive time, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Counsel?

15

MR. ESQUEDA:

16

MR. SIMMS: No, your Honor.

17

THE COURT: We'll be adjourned.

18

MR. ESQUEDA:

19

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

No, your Honor.

Thank you.

20
21

* * *

22
23
24
25
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